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Introduction
The three papers comprising this thesis are distinct and independent studies; yet,
they all explore interrelated facets of the broader field of environmental and cli-
mate policy, and international trade. They reflect my personal research interest
that focuses on issues of climate change and international trade as well as the nu-
merous and complex interdependencies that exist between the two fields. Interna-
tional trade can affect climate change by inducing economic growth, production
and transport of goods, all of which can lead to an increase in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, which are the main cause of rising global temperatures. Also,
climate change can affect international trade by altering comparative advantages,
changing spatial patterns and productivity of agriculture, leading to the emergence
of new products and industries, etc.
The relationship between climate change and international trade is clearly
bidirectional. However, we still know very little about the scope and even the
direction of many of the effects of the climate-trade relationship. A general rule
in that respect is that there are no general rules. For instance, moderately rising
average global temperatures will reduce agricultural output in some regions of the
world (mainly in the developing countries in tropical and subtropical areas), but
increase productivity and cultivation options in higher latitudes - both of which
will affect trade patterns. Further examples include the ongoing and heated dis-
cussion on the effect of international trade on pollution, and the debate over the
existence of an environmental Kuznets curve.
The three papers of this thesis tackle the environment-trade issue from an in-
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ternational environmental policy point of view. Hence, the underlying questions
of this thesis are how environmental challenges such as climate change should and
should not be addressed and how environmental policies and agreements interact
with international trade. In doing this, we approach the issue from different direc-
tions, assuming that there is either partial cooperation between affected countries
or that countries act unilaterally. The case of full global cooperation is of lim-
ited interest for an economist as it necessarily leads to the best possible outcome
from a welfare point of view. For this reason, in this thesis we do not address
mechanisms that facilitate international cooperation, but rather look at the welfare
effects and optimal policies under limited or no cooperation.
While a more technical synopsis of the results of this thesis is given in the sum-
mary below, the relevance of the studies for real world policy making is outlined
here in terms of intuitive reasoning.
The first paper of this thesis is on international environmental agreements
(IEAs). Today there are hundreds of IEAs in force and almost every country
in the world is part of at least one IEA. The need for international environmen-
tal cooperation is driven by the international dimension of environmental prob-
lems. Numerous pollutants are mobile across borders, traveling by air or water
and thus causing damage in countries outside those of their origin. By way of co-
operation, affected countries can internalize such external environmental effects.
However, cooperation is not always easy to achieve because some countries will
benefit more than others or even lose by cooperating. Free-riding incentives and
the Prisoner’s dilemma are typical phenomena in international environmental is-
sues. Literature has focused a lot on how to design mechanisms that facilitate
cooperation and break the Prisoner’s dilemma, and this is certainly an important
task. However, an IEA between some countries will, in general, not only affect
the members of the IEA, but also non-members. Such effects have generally been
ignored in the literature and are analyzed in the first paper of this thesis in the con-
text of a model of strategic trade and environmental policy. We show that an IEA
might be more than a simple tool to internalize externalities, but can implicitly be
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an exploitative trade contract that harms outsiders. The intuition behind this result
is quite simple. If exporter countries fight for market shares on third country mar-
kets, the competition favors the third countries as it depresses prices. If, however,
exporter countries cooperate, then they implicitly form a cartel to the disadvan-
tage of third country consumers. Such a cartel would be illegal by WTO rules
and thus cannot be implemented explicitly via a trade agreement; environmental
agreements, however, that are generally viewed as beneficial or at least innocu-
ous, might achieve the same task. Although such an IEA generally brings about
improvements in terms of reduced pollution, its adverse effects on consumer sur-
plus might outweigh all gains and lead to a welfare loss for the world as a whole.
Hence, a direct and general notion that follows from this study is that, when IEAs
are evaluated from a normative perspective, effects on third countries have to be
taken into account. As a more indirect implication, the results rather suggest that
regional or sub-global climate agreements are stumbling blocks and not building
blocks towards a comprehensive global climate agreement, as members of such
a partial agreement could gain at the expense of non-members making further
expansion more difficult.
The second chapter of this thesis takes a public choice perspective on strategic
trade and environmental policy. Here we investigate strategic interactions between
governments when they follow objectives other than pure maximization of wel-
fare. Arguably, in reality the behavior of bureaucrats and political decision mak-
ers can be and is influenced by lobbyists, political dogmata, religious beliefs and
many other motivations that are not congruent with social welfare maximization.
In these cases, outcomes of strategic interactions will have quite distinct positive
and normative implications. We take the maximization of environmental tax rev-
enue as an example of an objective that diverges from the textbook assumption
of welfare maximization and analyze how such distorted incentives translate into
different policy outcomes. One central and perhaps surprising result is that pol-
icy makers who do not have social welfare in mind can actually perform better in
welfare terms than “good dictators” that aim exclusively at maximizing welfare.
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This finding is quite intuitively explained by the facts that strategic rivalry between
governments in general does not lead to the jointly optimal outcome, and that equi-
libria of such strategic interactions heavily depend on the set of credible threats
of the governments. If governments can credibly commit to relatively high taxes,
i.e., if their objective is to maximize tax revenue, this can lead to an equilibrium
outcome in which social welfare is higher than under welfare maximizers. Strat-
ing from this insight, we investigate if welfare-maximizing governments could
exploit this by delegating environmental tax policy to revenue-maximizing policy
makers whenever this would be beneficial. We show that a commitment problem
renders this strategy infeasible in most cases. The main policy insight from this
paper is that standard economic intuitions are highly sensitive to the assumptions
about governments’ incentives. As the textbook assumption of countries being
governed by good dictators that have nothing but the wellbeing of their citizens in
their minds seems to be overly optimistic if one takes a look at (at least some) real
world politicians, policy recommendations based on models that incorporate that
assumption should be treated with caution.
The third paper of this thesis, which is a joint study with Prof. Frank Krysiak,
is concerned with unilateral climate policy, i.e., with climate policy that takes
place outside of an international agreement. If global efforts to reduce GHG
emissions are not coordinated between the emitting countries, additional costs
can arise that go beyond the direct abatement costs. First, emission-intensive in-
dustries might be driven out of the country that implements climate regulation and
continue to produce and to emit GHG emissions in other countries that have no
or less stringent regulations. This effect is known as “carbon leakage”. Second,
climate policy can lead to unemployment if labor markets are imperfect, partic-
ularly if wages are rigid, which, at least in the short run, is the case for many
industries. Finally, unilateral climate policy can lead to worsening terms of trade.
All of these effects are potential ammunition for opponents of unilateral climate
policy and can lead to considerable domestic political pressure against unilateral
action. This paper turns to the question of how unilateral climate policy should
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be designed to reduce welfare losses stemming from the factors mentioned above.
Additionally, we take into consideration, that national political decision makers
are bound by the WTO agreements that prohibit direct trade intervention. For
the case of emitting final goods sectors, it has been shown in the literature that
differentiating emission regulation between sectors that are open to international
trade and such that are purely national is optimal. If, however, GHG emissions are
caused by the production of an intermediate good, such an approach is infeasible.
In this chapter we show that an intervention in the intermediate good sector can
be an optimal strategy to reduce the costs of unilateral climate policy. The results
of this study have direct implications for policy design, as they suggest feasible
climate policy regimes that can be part of unilateral strategies to cut emissions for
countries that wish to be frontrunners.
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Summary
This thesis comprises of three papers on various aspects of trade and the environ-
ment.
The first paper takes a closer look at the interplay of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs), trade and welfare. It is well known from the litera-
ture of strategic environmental policy that governments bound by WTO-rules that
preclude direct trade intervention may use environmental policy as a substitute
for trade policy. Studying a third-market model with imperfect competition and
global emissions, we first show that the strategic rivalry between exporter coun-
tries causes a welfare loss for both countries. Such a loss represents a motivation
for the countries involved to conclude an IEA that internalizes the external ef-
fects. Welfare of the exporter countries increases as a consequence of such an
IEA. However, we show that, taking into account the accompanying loss of con-
sumer surplus in third countries, the overall welfare effect might be negative, so
that the world as a whole is worse off with than without the IEA. The main con-
clusions drawn from the first paper are that IEAs are a useful tool to internalize
environmental externalities, but that (i) malign welfare effects can arise in the
presence of pre-existing distortions such as imperfect competition; (ii) an evalua-
tion of the recent proliferation of regional IEAs has to take into account impacts
on non-members; and (iii) regional IEAs may not be a fruitful way of addressing
global environmental challenges such as climate change.
The second paper analyzes the impact of decisions made by governments that
are not strict welfare maximizers on strategic and cooperative environmental pol-
xii
icy making. Again we analyze a version of the third-country model of strategic
trade policy including pollution and, inspired by the public choice view on gov-
ernments and bureaucrats, we show that decisions made by policy makers that
have incentives diverging from pure welfare maximization can lead to quite dis-
tinct outcomes both from a positive as well as from a normative point of view.
In particular, we show that even a fully cooperative IEA between governments
that maximize tax revenue rather than welfare may lead to a welfare loss for the
signatory countries. Furthermore, we demonstrate that tax revenue-maximizing
governments may lead to a higher welfare than welfare-maximizing governments,
because the former can credibly commit to higher emission tax levels. Finally, a
delegation game between governments is used as an illustration to show that the
strategic situation between the two exporter countries does not always correspond
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma but might be of several other game-theoretic types.
These results expose the sensitivity of many of the conclusions from the strategic
trade and environmental policy literature to variations of the arguably optimistic
assumption that governments are strictly welfare-maximizing.
The third paper, which was written jointly with Prof. Frank Krysiak, is an
attempt to find strategies of reducing the costs and increasing the effectiveness of
unilateral climate policy. As a global climate agreement encompassing all major
emitters of GHGs is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future, but nonetheless
some countries such as the EU and Switzerland have decided to pursue reduction
targets independently, the question arises as to how such unilateral policies should
be optimally designed. For the case of emitting intermediate goods sectors, this
question has not been thoroughly addressed in the literature. Using a three-sector
general equilibrium model it is shown that, if the production of an intermediate
good, such as electricity or transportation services, causes GHG emissions, it can
be optimal to (partially) contain the effects of climate policy to that sector. Con-
tainment consists of a subsidy or tax on the intermediate good and is a second-best
policy in the presence of WTO rules for the cases of carbon leakage and market
power; through containment, also climate policy-induced unemployment can be
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reduced. The results of this paper suggest ways in which countries that wish to
be frontrunners could design climate policies that achieve reduction cuts at lower
costs and thus also reduce domestic political pressure against unilateral action.
xiv
Chapter 1




This study explores the global welfare effects of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) that coordinate emission policies between exporter countries. We
show that, when export markets are imperfectly competitive, IEAs might cause
a global welfare loss even if non-signatories benefit from lower emission levels.
This result is due to a loss of consumer surplus in importer countries. From a
global welfare perspective, the desirability of IEAs depends on the size of the
signatories and the harmfulness of emissions.
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1.1 Introduction
In the last decades, governments all over the world have signed a large number of
international environmental agreements (IEAs). There are more than 270 IEAs in
force today according to UNEP (2005); more than 120 of them were signed after
1990.
Economic research on IEAs has largely focussed on issues of stability and
compliance.1 In contrast, the global welfare effects of IEAs have not received
much attention.
An IEA that implements jointly optimal environmental policies necessarily
improves the total welfare of signatories. If such an agreement leads to less pollu-
tion, one is tempted to believe that, if any, the welfare effects on non-signatories
are positive, and the world as a whole is better off with than without the IEA.
In this study we explore the global welfare effects of IEAs between govern-
ments that have strategic trade policy incentives, and come to a more nuanced
conclusion.
Our analysis departs from the following simple setting: The production of
an export good causes internationally mobile emissions. Governments of pol-
luter countries can regulate emissions cooperatively or non-cooperatively. If firms
compete on imperfectly competitive export markets, this changes the nature and
effects of both cooperative and non-cooperative environmental policy setting as
compared to perfect competition. From the literature on strategic environmental
policy, it is well known that governments might use environmental policy as a
proxy for strategic trade policy if the latter is not feasible. In such a situation,
governments of exporting/polluting countries choose weak environmental regula-
tion in order to shift rents from foreign firms to home firms. Signing an IEA on
jointly optimal environmental policies eliminates this strategic conflict between
exporting countries and thus unambiguously improves their welfare. However,
the global welfare effects of such an IEA are less clear cut.
1See e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994a).
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In this paper, we show that, even if non-signatories benefit from lower emis-
sion levels, an IEA might reduce global welfare as the associated loss of consumer
surplus in importing countries might outweigh all welfare gains. In particular, we
demonstrate that from a global perspective, the desirability of an IEA depends on
the size of the signatory countries and the degree of harmfulness of emissions.
Furthermore, we show that an IEA between exporter countries might implement
environmental regulation that is either too lax or too strict as compared to the
global optimum.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a
literature review; in section 3 a simple model is developed; section 4 explains the
main findings, and in section 5 the conclusions are presented.
1.2 Literature Review
The seminal contribution by Brander and Spencer (1985) has laid the ground for
a rich body of literature on trade policy under imperfect competition. Brander
and Spencer (1985) have shown that if export markets are imperfectly competi-
tive, interventionist policies become attractive. The reason for this is the presence
of rents that creates incentives for beggar-thy-neighbour trade policy (Brander,
1986). Through strategic policy setting, governments can shift rents from a for-
eign firm to a home firm. If competition is à la Cournot, it is in the individual
interest of exporting countries to subsidize, whereas they would do better as a
group without subsidies.23 Thus, governments find themselves in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma that leads to a Pareto-suboptimal outcome.
A notable extension of the Brander and Spencer (1985) model emerged paral-
lel to advancing international trade liberalization beginning in the 1990s. With di-
rect export subsidies becoming largely illegal under GATT/WTO rules, secondary
trade policies have gained increasing attention. Several authors have extended the
2In fact, exporters’ joint welfare-maximizing policy would be a negative export subsidy, i.e. an
export tax (Brander and Spencer, 1985).
3Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown that the opposite is true if firms compete in prices.
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Brander and Spencer (1985) framework to the case of polluting industries. Re-
search in the area of strategic environmental policy has been spearheaded, among
others, by Barrett (1994b), Rauscher (1994) and Ulph (1996). One general con-
clusion emerging from these studies is that if the production costs of firms are
positively related to the stringency of domestic environmental regulation, envi-
ronmental policies will be laxer than first-best. However, Greaker (2003a) showed
that the opposite is the case if emissions are an inferior input. Conrad (2001) uses
a reversed timing version of Brander and Spencer (1985) in order to explain why
firms engage in voluntary environmental agreements. Investigating this issue in
a model where firms are footloose, Greaker (2003b) comes to the somewhat sur-
prising result that the threat of plant relocation can lead to stricter environmental
policy. Burguet and Sempere (2003) analyze the effects of trade liberalization on
environmental policies and welfare.
To our knowledge, Walz and Wellisch (1997) are the only authors who include
world welfare considerations in a model of strategic trade and environmental pol-
icy. In this sense, it is the paper most closely related to ours. However, our analy-
sis differs in two fundamental ways from that of Walz and Wellisch (1997). First,
while Walz and Wellisch (1997) take pollution as being purely local, we consider
globally mobile emissions. This adds an additional dimension to the model, as
pollution constitutes a negative externality which has to be taken into account.
Second, Walz and Wellisch (1997) study a move towards free trade, i.e. direct ex-
port subsidies are allowed, and the welfare implications of a ban on such subsidies
are analyzed. We start our analysis at a point where export subsidies are already
banned, which we believe comes closer to today’s reality. We then take the case
of international environmental cooperation, and analyze its global welfare effects.
In this sense, our study takes a new approach and arrives at results absent so far in
the literature on strategic environmental policy.
4
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1.3 The model
For our analysis, we develop a version of the Brander and Spencer (1985) 2-stage
game, where, in the first stage, governments of polluter countries set environmen-
tal policies, and, in the second stage, firms play Cournot-Nash. We then make
a welfare comparison between international environmental cooperation and non-
cooperation by considering two different ways of policy setting in the first stage.
The model consists of three countries A, B and C (rest of the world). In coun-
tries A and B there is one firm each, producing a normal homogeneous good. The
total production is exported to country C. The two firms compete in quantities.
Production is accompanied by emission of a global pollutant for which gov-
ernments set a standard.
In the first subgame, governments A and B simultaneously set emission stan-
dards.4 In the second subgame, firms simultaneously decide on output levels,
taking emission standards as given. We solve the model by backwards induction,
considering the second stage of the game first.
1.3.1 Firms’ behavior
We will assume that the two firms are symmetric and neither has means to influ-
ence its government’s decision on the emission standard, so that each firm faces
the following profit maximization problem:
max
xi
Πi = Ri(xi, xj)− Ci(xi, ei) (1.1)
with the subscript denoting the country (i = A,B; i 6= j), x being output, Π
being profit, R being revenue, C being costs and e being the emission standard. We
assume that costs depend on the quantity of output produced and on the emission
standard in the following manner:
4As there is only one firm per country, taxes and standards are equivalent. Hence, all results
obtained in our analysis also hold for the case of emission taxes.
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A first-order condition for a profit maximum obtains from taking the partial









We assume that the second-order condition and the Routh-Hurwitz stability
conditions are satisfied so that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is unique and stable.5














Lemma 1. Equilibrium output of firm i increases (decreases) in the emission stan-
dard of country i (j).
Proof. See Appendix.
As the two firms are symmetric and the equilibrium is unique, the firms’ output
choices will be symmetric functions of the emission standards in both countries.
1.3.2 Strategic government behavior
In the first stage of the game, the emission standard of country i is determined by
government i that maximizes welfare, given the Cournot-Nash game of the firms
and the strategic choice of ej by government j.
5See Tirole (1988) chapter 5.7.
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Welfare consists of firm profits, consumer surplus from domestic consumption
and environmental damage from emissions.
We normalize the world population size to 1 and assume that all consumers
are identical. A fraction φ
2
of the world population lives in each exporter country
and a fraction 1−φ in the rest of the world. The world market for the traded good
is fully integrated, so that there is only one price. Global net consumer surplus is




P (X)dX − P (X)X , with CS ′(X) > 0 and X = xi + xj .
Furthermore, we assume that emissions cause environmental damage in each
country. This damage is measured by a convex function of global emissions:
γD(E), with γD′(E) > 0 , γD′′(E) > 0 where E = ei + ej and γ ≥ 0.
The parameter γ is a measure of the harmfulness of emissions.
Government i hence solves the following maximization problem:
max
ei




Differentiating (1.7) with respect to ei and substituting in (1.1) and (1.3) yields























Equations (1.8) are the usual conditions that equate marginal damage with
marginal benefit for both exporter countries.
Again we assume that the second-order conditions and the Routh-Hurwitz
conditions are satisfied.
Considering the firms’ behavior in the second stage and the government be-
havior in the first stage, equilibrium emission standards and output levels can be
6We assume the existence of a well-behaved demand function X(P) that is continuous and
strictly decreasing wherever X(P)>0; P(X) is the implied inverse demand function.
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calculated. As country A and country B are identical, a unique symmetric equi-









From the point of view of exporter countries, these NCN emission standards
are not jointly optimal.
Lemma 2. In NCN, a decrease in emission standards leads to an increase in
exporters’ joint welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is analogous to the result obtained by Brander and Spencer (1985)
on export subsidies and highlights the Prisoner’s Dilemma faced by exporter coun-
tries. The choice of exporter countries that is individually rational leads to a jointly
suboptimal outcome. Brander and Spencer (1985) do not analyze the cooperative
case correctly pointing out that countries could not credibly commit to coopera-
tion. However, in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas, cooperation can be sustained as
equilibrium. While our model is not explicitly dynamic, one could imagine that
governments face the decision whether or not to honor an IEA every period, rather
than once and for all (which corresponds to the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma), and
thus cooperation is a relevant and important case to be considered.
1.3.3 Government cooperation
Let us now take the case of an IEA. If the governments cooperate in setting emis-
sion standards, they solve the following joint optimization problem in the first
stage of the game:
max
ei,ej
Wi+j = Πi(xi, xj, ei) + Πj(xi, xj, ej) + φCS(X)− 2γD(E) (1.11)
8
Chapter 1 IEAs and global welfare

















Equations (1.12) differ from (1.8) in three ways reflecting that the governments
now take into account the effects the emission standard in one exporter country
has on environmental damage, revenues and net consumer surplus in the other ex-
porter country. These additional terms reduce emission standards in the resulting
symmetric equilibrium which we designate as Cooperation-Cournot-Nash equi-
librium (CCN):
Proposition 1. In the CCN case, emission standards and output levels are strictly
lower than under NCN.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rationale behind Proposition 1 is explained by the absence of rent-shifting
and the presence of rent-extracting under CCN. If governments cooperate, they in-
dividually have no longer any incentives to increase the home firm’s market share
at the foreign firm’s expense by subsidizing exports through lax environmental
regulation. Moreover, governments jointly have incentives to tax exports by set-
ting strict emission standards in order to extract rents from the rest of the world.
However, by doing so they also hurt the consumers within the exporter countries,
which in turn attenuates the rent-extracting incentives.
1.4 World welfare
What are the effects of international environmental cooperation on global welfare?
Let us define global welfare as the sum of welfare in the three countries:
WG = 2WE +WI (1.13)
9
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with WE being welfare of an exporting country in equilibrium and WI being
welfare of the importing country corresponding to:
WI = (1− φ)CS(X)− γD(E) (1.14)
Clearly, the net welfare effect of an IEA between exporting countries on the
rest of the world is a priori ambiguous.
On the one hand, consumer surplus in the CCN setting is lower than the NCN
level (’supply effect’). On the other hand, less production also causes fewer emis-
sions and thus, less environmental damage (’pollution effect’). In general, either
effect could dominate.
If the supply effect is outweighed by the pollution effect, the net global welfare
effect of an IEA is positive. However, if the opposite is true, one has to weigh the
welfare loss in the rest of the world against the welfare gains of exporters in order
to determine the sign of the net global effect. This sign depends crucially on the
population size of the exporting countries and the harmfulness of emissions.
In order to illustrate this point, let us consider the effect of each factor sepa-
rately.
1.4.1 No domestic consumption: φ = 0
This case corresponds to the "third market" model frequently studied in the liter-
ature on strategic trade policy.
The more harmful the emissions, the higher weighs the pollution effect against
the supply effect. This can be seen most clearly by looking at equations (1.7) and
(1.11). It is apparent that the weight of environmental damage relative to firm
profits in the government’s welfare maximization problem is determined by γ.
We can establish that the global welfare effect of an IEA is negative (positive) if
γ lies below (above) a certain threshold.
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Proposition 2. There exists a value γ∗0 ∈]0, γCCNc ] for which
γ < γ∗0 ⇔ ∆WG < 0 and γ > γ∗0 ⇔ ∆WG > 0










Figure 1.1: The critical damage parameter γ∗0
Proposition 2 contains the main insight of the analysis and is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.1. The governments of the exporting countries have two policy objectives.
First, there is the environmental policy goal, namely minimizing damage from
emissions. Second, there is the trade policy goal, namely securing maximal rents.
If exporting countries act strategically, governments seek to increase the home
country’s market share by implicitly subsidizing exports through lax environmen-
tal regulation. This beggar-thy-neighbour policy favors the rest of the world in
terms of consumer surplus as output is higher than in the cooperative case. How-
ever, higher production also leads to higher emissions which harm the rest of the
world.
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If exporting countries cooperate, the strategic conflict between the govern-
ments is broken and exporters can implement their jointly optimal environmental
regulation, which will lead to lower output. The rest of the world thus loses in
terms of consumer surplus, but benefits from lower emissions.
If γ is relatively low, the trade policy goal outweighs the environmental policy
goal in the exporters’ welfare function. As the objectives of the exporters and
the rest of the world are congruent concerning environmental policy but diametri-
cally opposed concerning trade policy, the rest of the world prefers that no IEA is
signed. This is due to the fact that when exporter countries act strategically, their
ability to pursue the trade policy objective (extracting rents) is lower than in the
cooperative case.
If γ is relatively high, emissions are relatively harmful so that the rest of the
world prefers that an IEA is signed. If exporter countries act cooperatively, they
will extract more rents from the rest of the world, but lower emission levels more
than outweigh this negative welfare effect.
From a world welfare point of view, an IEA is only preferred if γ lies above
some critical value, i.e. that emissions are "harmful enough" so that the global
environmental effect dominates the loss in total surplus.
1.4.2 The case with domestic consumption: φ ∈]0, 1]
If the exported good is also consumed domestically, there is a welfare cost at-
tached to contracting production under an IEA. This welfare cost increases in the
population size of the exporting countries.
By similar reasoning as in the above section we can show that:
Proposition 3. For every γ < γ∗0 , there exists a φ∗ ∈ ]0, 1] for which
φ < φ∗ ⇔ ∆WG < 0 and φ > φ∗ ⇔ ∆WG > 0
with ∆WG ≡ WCCNG −WNCNG
12
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Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1. If γ lies above γ∗0 , the sign of the global welfare effect of an IEA is
positive and independent of φ:








Figure 1.2: The critical population fraction φ∗
Proposition 3 shows that the global welfare effect of an IEA between polluter
countries is positively related to their size (see Figure 1.2). This result is quite
intuitive. The higher the fraction of the welfare of consumers included in the
decision of the governments, the higher are the benefits to be reaped by coopera-
tion. Thus we can conclude that IEAs encompassing large fractions of the world
are preferred over smaller IEAs. Our conclusion somewhat contrasts studies by
Asheim et al. (2006) and Osmani and Tol (2007) who find that two smaller IEAs
might lead to globally better outcomes than a single global treaty. Of course, in
these studies, stability rather than the effects of strategic trade policy incentives
13
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on the formulation of treaties is the issue. However, our results show that if gov-
ernments can use IEAs to extract rents from non-signatories, smaller (non-global)
agreements impose an additional welfare cost that is potentially high.
Figure 1.3 below finally shows the interdependence of the critical values of
the harmfulness of emissions and the size of the exporting countries. The grey
area corresponds to combinations of γ and φ that imply a negative global welfare
effect of an IEA between exporter countries. As can be seen, the higher φ, the





Figure 1.3: The sign of the global welfare effect of an IEA depends on γ and φ
1.4.3 The global optimum
Let us finally describe the globally optimal IEA. If the polluter countries take the
welfare of the rest of the world into account when formulating an IEA, that is, if
there is full global cooperation, the welfare optimization problem becomes:
max
ei,ej
WG = Πi(xi, xj, ei) + Πj(xi, xj, ej) + CS(X)− 3γD(E) (1.15)
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which corresponds to the equalization of marginal (global) environmental dam-
age with net marginal (global) benefits from production and consumption of the
good at the optimal emission level.
We denote the resulting global emission level with EFC (full cooperation) and
note the following:
Proposition 4. An IEA between polluter countries can lead to emission levels
below or above the global optimum:
EFC S ECCN
Proof. See Appendix.
This result shows that, perhaps against conventional wisdom, an IEA that does
not internalize environmental damage in non-signatory countries does not neces-
sarily lead to an emission level that is too high from a global perspective. The
reason for this is that we are in a second best world with more than one distor-
tion. The presence of market distortion due to imperfect competition can lead to
a situation where the rest of the world is better off if the polluter countries set less
stringent environmental regulations, even if this aggravates the pollution external-
ity.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that IEAs in imperfectly competitive market envi-
ronments carry various implications for the welfare of signatories and the rest of
the world. Alongside the obvious positive welfare effect of the internalization of
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an environmental externality, negative welfare effects accrue due to a loss of con-
sumer surplus. While signatories of IEAs are always better off with than without
such an agreement, non-signatories might suffer a net loss in welfare even if they
benefit from reduced global emission levels. This welfare loss potentially out-
weighs all positive welfare effects stemming from the IEA, so that the world as
a whole is worse off if polluter countries cooperate in setting emission policies.
We find that the global welfare effect of an IEA depends on the harmfulness of
emissions and on the population size of the signatory countries.
To keep the analysis as clear as possible, we made a number of simplifying
assumptions. First, in line with most of the literature on strategic trade and envi-
ronmental policy we consider a symmetric setting. This allows us to abstract from
effects due to idiosyncratic differences of governments and firms, and concentrate
fully on the effects of strategic incentives on the nature of IEAs between exporter
countries, which is the main focus of this paper. While we allow for differences
in size between exporters and importers, preferences are taken as identical. Incor-
porating North-South type differences in preferences for consumption or environ-
mental quality would be an interesting extension that is left for further research.
Second, we implicitly assume that damage from emissions is independent of pop-
ulation size. This is to avoid ad-hoc assumptions on a systematic relationship
between the number of inhabitants of a country and the damage it suffers from
emissions. At least for the case of damage from greenhouse gas emissions, this
seems to be a reasonable approximation, as population size is a rather negligible
factor compared to geographical location and ability to adapt to rising tempera-
tures. For other pollutants, this simplification might not be innocuous.
Brander and Spencer (1985) have explained the source and mechanism of
strategic incentives that induce governments to subsidize exports when there is
Cournot competition on the export market. Barrett (1994b) has shown that these
strategic incentives translate into distorted environmental policies when direct
trade policies are infeasible and environmental policy is used as a proxy. We find
that exporters might profit from their strategic advantage vis-à-vis the rest of the
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world by signing an IEA that serves as a tool not only for internalizing external
effects, but also for extracting rents. Such an IEA is de facto also a trade pol-
icy contract as it implicitly provides for export taxation by putting in place strict
environmental regulation.
Apart from their theoretical contribution, the results of this study inform the
policy debate surrounding IEAs and the world trade system. We show that IEAs
can cause distortions of international trade flows that lead to a welfare loss for the
world as a whole. Furthermore, we establish that regional environmental agree-
ments, today part of numerous regional trade agreements, can secure rents for
signatories at the expense of non-signatories. This makes enlargement of such
agreements difficult, as existing members could lose by further accession and
thus prefer to keep the agreement exclusive. Therefore, our results suggest that re-
gional environmental agreements are rather stumbling blocks than building blocks
for the solution of global environmental challenges.
There are a large number of IEAs and their number is steadily increasing,
and advancing global trade liberalization makes environmental policy a more and
more attractive vehicle for the exertion of market power and the exploitation of
strategic advantages. This paper is a first attempt to understand the global welfare
effects of IEAs by studying their interplay with international trade in an imper-
fectly competitive market environment. However, we believe that further theo-
retical and empirical research is needed to fully comprehend the implications of
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Proof of Lemma 1




























By assumptions (1.2), (1.4) and (1.5), both nominator and denominator are
positive so that dxi
dei
> 0.























Both terms of the nominator are negative by assumptions (1.2) and (1.6), re-




Proof of Lemma 2
In NCN, a unilateral change in the emission standard of country i has the following










The first term of the RHS of (1.19) equals zero by the first-order condition of














The first term of (1.20) is negative by Lemma 1. The second term is smaller
than the third term by (1.8). Hence it follows that ∂Wi+j(ei,ej)
∂ei
< 0
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows straightforwardly from Lemma 2. At NCN, lowering the emis-
sion standard in either country increases the exporter’s joint welfare. Therefore,
the joint welfare maximizing emission standard must lie below the NCN level. It
follows that eCCN < eNCN . As the firms’ equilibrium output levels are strictly
increasing in the emission level by Lemma 1, eCCN < eNCN ⇐⇒ xCCN <
xNCN .
Proof of Proposition 2





with ∆WG ≡ WCCNG −WNCNG
Proof. Consider once again equations (1.7) and (1.11), which characterize
the government’s problem in the Nash and the cooperative case, respectively. If
φ = 0 and γ = 0, the last terms disappear, which means that the government’s ob-
jective becomes identical to the firm’s problem of profit maximization, and global
welfare equals total surplus. It follows that, in the Nash case, the outcome is a
Cournot-duopoly, whereas in the cooperative case, the resulting equilibrium is a
collusive duopoly, i.e. a two firm monopoly. Hence, the world as a whole suffers
a deadweight welfare loss if an IEA is signed.
Let us next define γNCNc as the value at which global welfare under NCN
becomes zero.
Claim 2: WNCNG (γNCNc ) < WCCNG (γNCNc ).
Proof. By construction, at γNCNc , total surplus equals global environmental
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damage under NCN, which means that the emission level lies above the global
optimum. Hence, a decrease in emissions leads to an increase in global welfare.
As emissions under CCN are lower than under NCN the result follows.
Proposition 2 now follows from Claim 1 through 2 and the intermediate value
theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1
Claim 1: If there is no consumption in the rest of the world (i.e. no trade), the




with ∆WG ≡ WCCNG −WNCNG
Proof. It follows by inspection of (1.14) and by Proposition 1 that if φ = 1,
the rest of the world suffers no loss in consumer surplus but benefits from lower
emissions under CCN. Therefore, the world as a whole is better off if polluter
countries cooperate.
By definition, for any γ < γ∗0 , ∆WG is negative at φ = 0; and for any γ > γ
∗
0 ,
∆WG is positive at φ = 0.
Hence, the results follow from Claim 1 and the intermediate value theorem.
Proof of Proposition 4
At γ = 0 (and φ ∈ [0, 1[), EFC clearly lies above ECCN as there is no environ-
mental damage and the world as a whole suffers a pure deadweight loss from too
little production under CCN. As γ increases, both EFC and ECCN decrease, but
the former at a higher rate than the latter as, under full cooperation, global envi-
ronmental damage rather than environmental damage only in exporter countries is
taken into account. Therefore, above a certain value of γ, EFC < ECCN .
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In this paper we take a public choice perspective on strategic environmental pol-
icy and international environmental agreements. We examine cooperative and
non-cooperative environmental policies under governments that are either welfare
maximizers (“good dictators”) or tax revenue maximizers (“Leviathans”). We
show that Leviathans can perform better in terms of welfare and that good dicta-
tors can set higher taxes. We then analyze international environmental agreements
and show that the breakdown of environmental cooperation can indeed lead to a
welfare gain for all signatory countries. Considering a delegation game between
governments, we find that a Pareto-superior Leviathan outcome can be the unique
Nash-equilibrium.
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2.1 Introduction
In his seminal work, Niskanen (1971) has shown how governments that are not
maximizing welfare but rather budgets, power or influence can lead to inefficiency.
The notion that public officials (“bureaucrats”) are driven by such distorted incen-
tives is part of a school of thought that is known as public choice.
In this paper we take a public choice perspective on strategic environmental
policy and on international environmental agreements (IEAs). Instead of “good
dictators” we let countries be governed by “Leviathans”. In other words, gov-
ernments maximize revenue from emission taxation instead of welfare. This, of
course, is but one possible interpretation of government incentives from the rich
public choice school. We choose the somewhat extreme assumption of pure rev-
enue maximization not because we believe that governments actually behave this
way but rather use the approach as a vehicle to highlight some important fea-
tures of strategic and non-strategic environmental policy making in the absence
of the arguably equally extreme assumption of purely welfare-maximizing gov-
ernments. Furthermore, revenue-maximizing governments have been studied in
the literature before and therefore allow explicit comparison with existing results.
Additionally, our modeling approach has tractability and clarity, which enables a
lucid presentation of our results.
Our interpretation of the Leviathan should be treated with caution and should
be understood as illustrative. However, all our results could be qualitatively repro-
duced for a Leviathan that maximizes a convex combination of public welfare and
tax revenue and for many other incentive systems that diverge from strict welfare
maximization.
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate how such distorted incentives can
translate into distinct outcomes as well as normative evaluations of strategic sit-
uations and international agreements. The relevance of our results, of course,
depends essentially on one’s view of real-world political decision makers. In re-
ality, politicians can be driven by various incentives, such as public welfare, per-
sonal power or prestige, the probability of re-election, political dogmata, religious
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beliefs, the contributions of lobby groups etc. Hence, our analysis, in assum-
ing strictly revenue-maximizing governments, is not an attempt to derive general
results or predictions but rather aims at highlighting the crucial role played by
assumptions about the incentives of decision makers in the analysis of strategic
environmental policy and IEAs.
A main focus of the research on international agreements, in particular IEAs,
has been on how to overcome Prisoner’s dilemmas and other strategic deadlocks
so that cooperation can be maintained. To our knowledge, the question of whether
or not cooperation is desirable in the first place has not been addressed. In gen-
eral, cooperation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the attainment
of first-best outcomes in strategic situations. Decision makers need to have the
“right” incentives, too, otherwise the global optimum will not be reached even
if all parties concerned fully cooperate. Therefore, research on designing eco-
nomic, institutional and legal mechanisms that facilitate international cooperation
is highly important; if, however, decision makers are driven by any incentives
other than pure welfare maximization, cooperation might be harmful and the Pris-
oner’s dilemma might turn into a “Prisoner’s blessing”. To illustrate this point is
the main goal of this paper.
Our analysis is concerned with two strands of literature. First, this study is
related to the research on strategic environmental policy.1 This literature shows
that, in general, using environmental policy as a trade policy instrument is not
first-best. However, if direct trade intervention is infeasible e.g. due to WTO rules,
second-best environmental policies can diverge from the Pigouvian rule reflecting
a trade-off between strategic trade incentives and environmental concerns.
The results obtained in this study show that strategic and non-strategic envi-
ronmental policies might have quite different positive and normative implications
if one adopts a public choice view of governments.
In particular, we find that strategic environmental policy can not only lead to a
1See Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996) and Greaker (2003),
among others.
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laxer but also to a stricter emission regulation as compared to first-best. A similar
result was obtained by Greaker (2003), but it arises due to fundamentally different
reasons. In Greaker (2003), strategic environmental policy leads to a regulation
that is stricter than that prescribed by the Pigouvian principle if emissions are
an inferior input into production. In our case, however, the possibility of such a
“green strategy” arises due to the government’s very negligence of environmental
damage.
Furthermore, we show that full cooperation does not necessarily lead to a
jointly optimal outcome in terms of welfare, and can be Pareto-dominated by
non-cooperative Nash-behavior. To our best knowledge, this result is novel to
the literature on environmental treaties. In his study of a trade model with gov-
ernments that respond to lobby groups, Ornelas (2008) finds that a cooperative
multilateral trade agreement does not necessarily lead to the global optimum and
therefore regional trade agreements might bring about an improvement. However,
Ornelas (2008) does not offer an explicit analysis of how the cooperative multi-
lateral agreement compares with non-cooperation, but simply states that "a coop-
erative multilateral trade agreement normally improves upon a non-cooperative
equilibrium". In our case, the opposite might hold, as a cooperative agreement
can cause a welfare loss as compared to the non-cooperative situation.
Second, our study relates to the papers by Panagariya and Schiff (1994)
and Clarke and Collie (2008) who examine export tax games between revenue-
maximizing and welfare-maximizing governments. Our results reaffirm some of
the findings of these papers, but contradict others therein.
Panagariya and Schiff (1994) consider a third-market model with a perfectly
competitive export market. As the production of the exported good does not cause
an externality, export policy boils down to maximizing the domestic industry’s
profits. In our model, there is Cournot competition on export markets and pro-
duction of the export good causes emission of a pollutant. In such a setting, sub-
sidizing exports - not taxing them - would be the optimal unilateral trade policy
for welfare-maximizing governments. Assuming that WTO rules are in place that
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prohibit direct trade intervention in the form of export subsidies, governments use
emission taxes not only for environmental regulation but also for putting in place
hidden trade policies. In such a framework, the welfare effects of tax policies are
more subtle. In agreement with Panagariya and Schiff (1994), we find that it is
possible for a government that maximizes tax revenue to achieve a higher level of
welfare. However, as opposed to Panagariya and Schiff (1994), in our model a tax
revenue-maximizing government does not always set higher tax rates, but the op-
posite might be the case. Hence, welfare-maximizing governments might achieve
lower welfare than revenue-maximizing governments, and revenue-maximizing
governments might end up setting lower taxes than welfare-maximizing govern-
ments.
Clarke and Collie (2008) examine an export tax game where there is Bertrand
competition on the export market and goods are differentiated. Also in Clarke
and Collie (2008), welfare consists of net firm profits. The authors conclude that
if exports are close enough substitutes, welfare under tax revenue maximization
is always higher than under welfare maximization and delegating emission tax
policy to revenue-maximizing policy makers is the unique Nash-equilibrium. We
find, however, that even if exports are perfect substitutes, the opposite of both
results can hold. This apparent contradiction is explained by an additional envi-
ronmental effect that is due to emissions and by the different modes of competition
on the export market in Clarke and Collie (2008) and in this study.
The contributions of our findings are twofold. First, we derive results so far
absent from the literature and enhance the understanding of the interplay of en-
vironmental policy and international trade when the assumption of ideal, strictly
welfare-maximizing policy makers is dropped. Governments having the “right”
incentives might be outperformed by governments essentially acting in self-interest
because the former lack the ability to commit to cooperative policies. Second, our
results inform the debate on IEAs and trade. If governments are Leviathans rather
than good dictators, cooperative agreements might not be desirable and the break-
down of such agreements due to the Prisoner’s dilemma might in fact lead to an
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increase in welfare for the signatories.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 a simple
model is developed; in section 3, international environmental agreements are an-
alyzed; in section 4 a delegation game is studied, and in section 5 the conclusions
are presented.
2.2 The model
For our analysis, we develop a version of the Brander and Spencer (1985) 2-stage
game, where, in the first stage, governments of polluter countries set environmen-
tal policies, and, in the second stage, firms play Cournot-Nash. We then make
welfare comparisons between the good dictator and the Leviathan case.
The model consists of three countries A, B and C (rest of the world). In coun-
try A and B there is one firm each producing a normal homogeneous good. The
total production is exported to country C. The two firms compete in quantities on
the export market.
Production is accompanied by emission of a local pollutant2 for which gov-
ernments set a tax.
In the first subgame, governments A and B simultaneously set emission taxes.3
In the second subgame, firms simultaneously decide on output levels, taking emis-
sion taxes as given. We solve the model by backwards induction, considering the
second stage of the game first.
2.2.1 Firm’s problem
We will assume that the two firms are symmetric and neither has means to influ-
ence its government’s decision on the emission tax, so that each firm faces the
2The assumption of a local pollutant is not crucial for the analysis. Qualitatively, all results
obtained readily extend to the case of a global pollutant.
3Taxes and permits are equally efficient instruments for emission policy. Hence, all results
obtained also hold for the case of auctioned permits where the goal of a Leviathan regulator is to
maximize revenue from permit auctioning.
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following profit maximization problem:
max
xi
Πi(xi, xj) = Ri(xi, xj)− Ci(xi, ti) (2.1)
with the subscript denoting the country (i = A,B; i 6= j), x being output,
Π being profit, R being revenue, C being costs and t being the emission tax. We











It follows from Shepard’s lemma that emissions (e) correspond to the partial






A first-order condition for a profit maximum obtains from taking the partial









Throughout the paper we assume that second-order conditions and, where
applicable, Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions are satisfied. It follows that the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is unique and stable.5 Furthermore, the firms’ output











4The last assumption means that we treat emissions as a normal input.
5See Tirole (1988) chapter 5.7.
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Lemma 1. Equilibrium output of firm i decreases (increases) in the emission tax
of country i (j).
Proof. See Appendix.
As the two firms are symmetric and the equilibrium is unique, the firms’ output
choices will be symmetric functions of the emission taxes in both countries.
2.2.2 The benchmark case
Let us first assume that governments maximize welfare and cooperate in setting
emission taxes. This means that strategic rent-shifting incentives are absent, and
the external effect that emission taxation in one country has on welfare of the other
country is fully internalized.
Welfare consists of firm profits minus environmental damage from emissions.
We assume that damage in country i is a convex function of emissions in country
i:
γD′(ei) > 0 and γD′′(ei) > 0 (2.8)
with γ ≥ 0.
The parameter γ is a measure of the harmfulness of emissions, which means
that the higher γ is, the higher is total and marginal environmental damage from
pollution.
Hence, governments solve the following joint maximization problem:
max
ti,tj
Wi+j = Πi(xi, xj, ti)+Πj(xi, xj, tj)+ tiei+ tjej−γ(D(ei)+D(ej)) (2.9)
The first-order conditions yield the jointly optimal emission tax t∗:
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where e∗ is the efficient emission level for both countries.
The second term on the RHS of (2.10) is negative so that the governments’
jointly optimal emission tax lies above marginal damage. This divergence from
the Pigouvian rule is explained by the market power the exporters have on the third
country market. By setting relatively strict emission taxes governments implicitly
tax exports and thus contract production. Thereby, exporting countries extract
rents from rest of the world.
If governments act strategically, t∗ will not be the Nash-equilibrium of the
emission tax game. This is shown in the subsequent section.
2.2.3 The good dictator’s problem
If governments maximize welfare non-cooperatively, government i chooses ti in




Wi(ti) = Πi(xi, xj, ti) + tiei − γD′(ei) (2.11)
Differentiating (2.11) with respect to ti, substituting in (2.1) and (2.4), and
exploiting symmetry gives us the Nash-emission tax for the good dictator case,














The second term on the RHS of (2.12) is positive so that the Nash-emission
tax for the good dictator case lies below marginal damage in both countries. This
result is explained by the rent-shifting incentives of the governments, which im-
plicitly subsidize exports via lax environmental regulation in order to increase the
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home firm’s market share.
Re-establishing a central result of the strategic environmental policy literature6
we note that:
Lemma 2. Emission taxes in the Nash-equilibrium are below the efficient level.
Proof. The proof follows by inspection of (2.10) and (2.12).
Hence, the choice of exporter countries that is individually rational leads to
a jointly suboptimal outcome. Governments are trapped in a classic Prisoner’s
dilemma.
2.2.4 The Leviathan’s problem
Let us now take the case of Leviathan governments. Government i chooses ti




Ri(ti) = tiei(xi, ti) (2.13)
Differentiating the above equation with respect to ti and rearranging yields the












Note that the Leviathan equilibrium emission tax is independent of marginal
environmental damage because the Leviathan is only interested in tax revenue and
has no environmental concerns.
2.2.5 Welfare analysis
Let us now compare the good dictator and the Leviathan cases in terms of welfare.
Comparing (2.12) with (2.14), it becomes clear that it depends on the harmfulness
6See e.g. Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996) and Nannerup (1998).
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of emission whether the good dictators or the Leviathans set higher emission taxes.
The following Proposition illustrates this key role of γ.
Proposition 1. If γ lies below (above) a critical value γ, the Leviathans sets a
higher (lower) emission tax rate than the good dictators.
(a) If the Leviathans set a lower emission tax than the good dictators, i.e. if
γ > γ, the good dictators achieve a higher welfare than the Leviathans.
(b) If the Leviathans set an emission tax higher than the good dictators but
lower than a critical value, i.e. if γ < γ < γ, the Leviathans achieve a
higher welfare than the good dictators.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. Leviathans do not care
about environmental damage but only about revenue. Therefore, the Leviathan
emission tax in equilibrium depends directly only on the cost structure of the
firms, i.e. how much emissions they produce, and is independent of the harmful-
ness of emissions. Equilibrium emissions taxes in the good dictator case, however,
depend directly on the harmfulness of emissions. Thus, the damage parameter γ,
that measures the harmfulness of emissions, determines the relative positions of
the emission taxes that are jointly optimal (t∗), and Nash-equilibria for good dic-
tators (tNG) and Leviathans (tNL), respectively. While the good dictator emission
taxes always lie below the jointly optimal level, the Leviathan emission taxes can
be either above or below t∗. Hence, if the Leviathans set taxes that lie above tNG,
but not too far above t∗, they achieve a higher welfare level.
The less harmful emissions are, the lower are both the jointly optimal and the
good dictator-emission tax. Hence, for relatively harmless emissions (γ < γ), the
Leviathans set emission taxes that are higher than t∗ and yield a lower level of
welfare than the good dictators. In such a case, environmental damage is lower
under Leviathans, but so are firm profits; as the latter more than outweigh the
former, welfare is higher under good dictators. On the other hand, if emissions
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are relatively harmful (γ > γ), Leviathans set emission taxes that lie below tNG
and thus also below t∗. This means that environmental damage is higher and firm
profits are lower under Leviathans; hence, again welfare is higher in the good
dictator case. However, if γ lies between the specified critical values, Leviathans
perform better in welfare terms.
Finally, it must be noted that the possibility of revenue-maximizing govern-
ments reaching a higher welfare level than welfare-maximizing governments is
only given because the good dictators are unable to overcome the Prisoner’s dilemma
and to commit to the first-best emission taxes.
2.3 International environmental agreements
To study international environmental agreements (IEAs) from a public choice an-
gle, we first define an IEA as a cooperative agreement between governments on
jointly optimal emission taxes. For the case of good dictators this corresponds to
the benchmark case studied in subsection 2.2.2. As this is the first-best situation,
clearly an IEA is desirable from a welfare point of view. However, as the emission
tax game is a Prisoner’s dilemma, game theory predicts that the IEA will not hold,
and the countries will end up in a Pareto-inferior Nash-equilibrium.




Wi+j(ti, tj) = tiei(xi, ti) + tjej(xj, tj) (2.15)


















Comparing (2.16) with (2.14) we find that cooperating Leviathan governments
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always set higher emission taxes than non-cooperative Leviathans. The reason for
this is that cooperative Leviathans internalize the tax revenue externality that is
ignored by non-cooperative Leviathans. Higher taxes in one country lead to an
increase in output and emissions of the firm in the other country, and thus emis-
sion tax revenue increases there. However, also cooperating Leviathans ignore
environmental damage from emissions. Therefore, the welfare comparison be-
tween the two cases is a priori ambiguous. It could be that the breakdown of an
IEA between Leviathan governments due to the Prisoner’s dilemma brings about
a welfare gain for both parties. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If γ < γc, the Nash-equilibrium Pareto-dominates a fully cooper-
ative IEA between Leviathan governments. Hence, if γ < γc, the breakdown of an
IEA leads to an increase in welfare for both signatory countries.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above result is easily explained by the incentive structure of Leviathan
governments. Neither in the cooperative, nor in the non-cooperative case do
Leviathans care about environmental damage. Hence, the equilibrium emission
tax rates under an IEA and under strategic behavior are independent of the harm-
fulness of emissions γ. However, the jointly optimal tax rate t∗ depends on γ,
which therefore determines the relative positions and distances of tNL and tCL,
respectively, to t∗. As the emission taxes under an IEA are always higher than
in the absence of cooperation, the likelihood that an IEA leads to a welfare gain
for signatories is higher if emissions are relatively harmful. If emissions cause
relatively little damage, the efficient tax rate is low and thus cooperation is more
likely to be undesirable from a welfare perspective.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the Prisoner’s dilemma that the governments
are facing might in fact be beneficial for the welfare of signatory countries. If gov-
ernments are not strictly maximizing welfare, but rather follow other objectives,
cooperation in general does not lead to the first-best outcome. In such a case, the
Nash-equilibrium might Pareto-dominate full cooperation in welfare terms.
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In conclusion we can state that if governments are run by good dictators rather
than Leviathans, IEAs always increase the welfare of signatories. If Leviathans
engage in cooperation this need not necessarily be the case. From a static game-
theoretic point of view, an IEA should be viable in neither case due to the Pris-
oner’s dilemma. However, if one views adherence to an international agreement
as an infinitely repeated game rather than a one-shot decision, cooperation can be
sustained in equilibrium if discount rates are not too high. In such a case, whether
or not our analysis admits a favorable view of IEAs eventually also depends on
whether one sees governments rather as good dictators or rather as Leviathans.
The main point made here is that if the governments’ incentives in any way di-
verge from the - arguably optimistic - assumption of pure welfare maximization,
IEAs might not bring about any welfare gain and might even be harmful for the
signatories.7
2.4 The delegation game
In section 2.2.5 we have found that revenue-maximizing governments can reach a
higher welfare level than welfare maximizers if the harmfulness of emissions lies
within a critical range. This begs the following question. If governments really
are good dictators, but revenue maximizing yields higher welfare, why do gov-
ernments not delegate emission policy to a Leviathan whenever this is preferable
over welfare maximization? In this section we show that a commitment problem
might render this strategy infeasible.
We now consider a 3-stage delegation game where the governments can either
delegate emission tax policy to a welfare-maximizing or to a revenue-maximizing
policy maker in the first stage of the game. In the second stage, the policy makers
choose emission taxes, and the third stage is the firms’ Cournot-Nash game.
The nature of the delegation game in general depends on all parameters of the
7E.g. an IEA could also be undesirable for the signatory countries if one makes a less radical
definition of the Leviathan as a government that maximizes a convex combination of social welfare
and tax revenue.
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model and can be a Prisoner’s dilemma, a coordination game or a game where
the Pareto-optimal outcome is the unique Nash-equilibrium. In order to be able
to derive explicit results and to highlight the important role the damage parameter
γ plays, we assume specific functional forms for our model and study a linear-
quadratic example.
We assume that unit production costs are constant and that one unit of output
is accompanied by one unit of emissions so that there is no abatement technology.
Hence, firm i has the following cost function:
Ci = (c− ti)xi (2.17)
Firms face a linear inverse demand function:
P (xi + xj) = α− xi − xj (2.18)




In this model, delegating emission tax policy to Leviathan policy makers is
Pareto-efficient and a Nash-equilibrium only for a relatively small interval of γ.
This is shown in the following proposition.89
Proposition 3. The game-theoretic nature of the delegation game depends exclu-
sively on the parameter γ, i.e. on the harmfulness of emissions.
(a) For 0 ≤ γ < 1, delegating emission tax policy to Leviathan policy mak-
ers in both countries is Pareto-superior to a situation where both countries
delegate emission tax policy to good dictators.
(i) For 0 ≤ γ < 0.77, the unique Nash-equilibrium is for both govern-
ments to delegate emission tax policy to good dictator policy makers,
8We only consider equilibria in pure strategies.
9We round the critical values to two digits after the comma.
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i.e. the delegation game is a Prisoner’s dilemma.
(ii) For 0.77 < γ < 0.82, there are two Nash-equilibria where either
both governments delegate emission tax policy to good dictators or to
Leviathans, respectively, i.e. the delegation game is a pure coordina-
tion game.
(iii) For 0.82 < γ < 1, the unique Nash-equilibrium is for both gov-
ernments to delegate emission tax policy to Leviathan policy makers,
i.e. the delegation game leads both governments to the Pareto-efficient
outcome.
(b) For γ > 1, delegating emission tax policy to good dictator policy makers in
both countries is Pareto-superior to a situation where both countries dele-
gate emission tax policy to Leviathans. As delegating emission tax policy
to a good dictator is also the dominant strategy, the delegation game leads















(b) WNG vs. WAi
Figure 2.1: The game theoretic nature of the delegation game depends on γ
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Figure 2.1 illustrates Proposition 3. In 2.1(a) we plot the equilibrium wel-
fare of a country in the Leviathan - Leviathan outcome and in case it deviates
by delegating emission tax policy to a good dictator (WAj ) as a function of the
harmfulness of emissions. Only for 0.77 < γ < 1 such a deviation is not welfare
improving. In 2.1(b) there is equilibrium welfare of a country in the good dictator
- good dictator outcome and in case it deviates by delegating emission tax policy
to a Leviathan (WAi ). For 0.82 < γ < 1 such a deviation is welfare improving.
Hence, the results of Proposition 3 follow.
The various intervals characterized in Proposition 3 have intuitive explana-
tions. In the cases (i) and (iii) of part (a), delegating emission tax policy to a good
dictator and to a Leviathan policy maker, respectively, are dominant strategies. A
Leviathan sets higher emission taxes than a good dictator leading to less environ-
mental damage (’environmental effect’) and lower firm profits (’profit effect’). In
case (i), the emissions are relatively harmless, therefore the negative profit effect
dominates the positive environmental effect from the point of view of government
i irrespective of government j’s choice. In case (iii) the opposite holds. For the
intermediate range given by case (ii), the best response of government i if gov-
ernment j delegates emission tax policy to a good dictator (Leviathan) is to do the
same. If government j chooses a good dictator policy maker, government i’s best
response is also to delegate emission tax policy to a policy maker that sets a rela-
tively low emission tax, i.e. to a good dictator. This causes higher environmental
damage, but also higher firm profits which leaves country i better off than in the
asymmetric outcome. However, if government j delegates emission tax policy to a
Leviathan who sets higher taxes that a good dictator, government i’s best response
is also to choose a Leviathan. Hence, governments face a coordination problem.
Part (b) of Proposition 3 is simply explained by the fact that the harmfulness
of emissions is above a critical value so that Leviathans set lower emission taxes
than good dictators. This means that environmental damage under good dictators
is lower than under Leviathans. As environmental damage is valued relatively
high for γ > 1, the environmental effect always dominates the profit effect so that
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delegation to a good dictator is the dominating strategy.
If γ = 0, the emissions cause no harm and the emission tax game collapses
to an export tax game. A well-known finding by Brander and Spencer (1985) is
that the Nash-equilibrium of this game is a subsidy on exports, while the Pareto-
optimum is export taxation. Therefore, the Leviathans achieve a higher welfare
level in equilibrium. However, delegation to a Leviathan policy maker is not a
Nash-equilibrium, so that the game is a Prisoner’s dilemma where both govern-
ments delegate to welfare-maximizing policy makers and are stuck in a Pareto-
suboptimal situation. As there is no emission damage, this result can be directly
compared to Clarke and Collie (2008), who find that for perfect substitutes, del-
egating the decision on export taxation to revenue maximizers is both Pareto-
efficient and a Nash-equilibrium. The reason for these divergent results is that
we consider the case of Cournot competition, while in Clarke and Collie (2008)
competition is à la Bertrand. Such a dependence of optimal policies on the nature
of competition on the export market is typical for models of strategic trade policy,
as has been lucidly demonstrated by Eaton and Grossman (1986).
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have taken a public choice perspective on strategic environmental
policy and on IEAs.
We have shown that governments that are maximizing tax revenue instead of
welfare might outperform welfare-maximizing governments in terms of welfare.
This perhaps counterintuitive result is due to the strategic situation between the
governments of exporting countries. The lack of ability to commit to coopera-
tion because of the Prisoner’s dilemma leaves welfare-maximizing governments
in a Pareto-suboptimal situation. Revenue maximizers face the same commit-
ment difficulty, and might as well end up in a Pareto-suboptimal equilibrium from
the governments’ point of view. However, from a social welfare perspective, the
Nash-emission tax under revenue-maximizing governments might be preferable
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to the Nash-emission tax under welfare maximizers.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that even fully cooperative IEAs might
not be desirable. If revenue-maximizing rather than welfare-maximizing govern-
ments conclude agreements, they might lead to a welfare loss for both countries.
In such cases, the breakdown of an IEA due to the Prisoner’s dilemma brings
about a Pareto-improvement from the social perspective. Concerning policy im-
plications, this study informs the debate surrounding IEAs and the world trade
system. In an earlier study on strategic environmental policy, we have shown that
fully cooperative IEAs between welfare-maximizing governments might lead to
a global welfare loss if one takes into account their effects on third countries. In
this paper we show that if governments are not driven by “textbook” incentives,
the very same countries that signed the IEAs might end up being worse off than
before.
Finally, studying a delegation game, we have shown that the harmfulness
of emissions is the key parameter for determining the game theoretic nature of
strategic interaction between governments and both the positive and normative
properties of Nash-equilibria. Delegation of emission policy to either welfare-
maximizing or revenue-maximizing governments might be Pareto-dominating.
Furthermore, the Pareto-superior delegation decision can be the unique Nash-
equilibrium for some parameter values. In general, the delegation game can be
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Proof of Lemma 1



























By assumptions (2.2) and (2.5), the nominator is negative while it follows from
(2.6) that the denominator is positive so that dxi
dti
< 0.























By assumptions (2.2) and (2.7), the nominator is positive while it follows from
(2.6) that the denominator is positive so that dxi
dti
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
At γ = 0, emissions cause no damage and the good dictator’s problem essentially
collapses to the pure rent shifting game between the governments, and the emis-
sion tax is de facto an export tax. As Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown, the
equilibrium policy in the rent shifting game is an export subsidy, which translates
into an emission subsidy in our model. Even ruling out the possibility of an emis-
sion subsidy, the equilibrium policy for good dictators at γ = 0 is a zero tax, while
Leviathans would still set a strictly positive tax. Note that the Leviathan equilib-
rium emission tax is independent of γ, while the emission tax in the good dictator
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case is increasing in γ. Hence, above a threshold level of γ, which we denote by
γ, the good dictator equilibrium emission tax is higher than in the Leviathan case.
(a) If γ < γ, emission taxes in the Leviathan equilibrium, are lower than in the
good dictator equilibrium. Lemma 2 shows that in the good dictator case,
emission taxes are below the jointly optimal level t∗. Hence, the Leviathan
taxes being even below the good dictator taxes yield a lower welfare.
(b) If γ > γ, emission taxes in the Leviathan equilibrium, are higher than in the
good dictator equilibrium. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the Leviathan case to be welfare superior. If the Leviathan taxes exceed
the jointly optimal level t∗ by a sufficient margin, welfare under good dic-
tators is higher. Hence, if and only if γ is higher than γ, but lower than a
critical value γ, the Leviathans yield a higher welfare than good dictators in
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
If governments are run by Leviathans, emission taxes under an IEA are always
higher than in the Nash-case, and, in both cases, taxes are independent of envi-
ronmental damage. However, the jointly optimal emission tax t∗ is increasing in
the harmfulness of emissions γ. Hence, the relative positions of the cooperative,
non-cooperative and jointly optimal emission taxes are determined by γ. It fol-
lows that below a critical value γc, the Nash-emission tax yields a higher welfare
than the taxes under an IEA.
Proof of Proposition 3
Straightforward calculation yields firm output in the symmetric equilibrium of the





(α− c− 2ti + tj)
3
(2.22)
Welfare-maximizing policy makers solve the following problem
max
ti
Wi = pii + tiei − γD(ei) = (α− xi − xj − c+ ti)xi − γx2i (2.23)
Substituting (2.22) into the first-order conditions of the above problem and sim-
plifying yields the equilibrium tax rate tNL. Substituting tNG back into (2.23)
gives welfare for the case where both governments delegate emission policy to
welfare-maximizing policy makers
WNG =
2(a− c)2(1 + 2γ)
(5 + 4γ)2
(2.24)
Revenue-maximizing policy makers solve the following problem
max
ti
Ri = tiei = tixi (2.25)
Substituting (2.22) into the first order conditions of the above problem and simpli-
fying yields the equilibrium tax rate tNL. Substituting tNL back into (2.25) gives
welfare for the case where both governments delegate emission policy to revenue
maximizing policy makers
WNL = − 2
81
(a− c)2(2γ − 5) (2.26)
If country i delegates emission policy to a revenue-maximizing policy maker and
country j to a welfare-maximizing policy maker, welfare in the asymmetric equi-
librium corresponds to
WNAi = −






50(a− c)2(1 + 2γ)
(17 + 28γ)2
(2.28)
Comparing (2.24), (2.26), (2.27), and (2.28), it becomes clear that the ratio of
welfare in the various equilibria depends only on γ. If both countries delegate
emission tax policy to revenue-maximizing policy maker, welfare is higher than




> 1. Hence, for γ < 1, Leviathans yield higher welfare. The
critical values for γ defining the game theoretic nature of the delegation game can
similarly be calculated by solving W
NL
WNAj
= 1 and W
NG
WNAi
= 1 for γ.
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Chapter 3
Unilateral climate policy and
optimal containment in an open
economy
Co-authored with Frank Krysiak
Abstract
Without a broad international agreement, climate policy is less effective, due to
carbon leakage, and more costly, due to causing unemployment and a loss of
competitiveness on international markets. We investigate whether these negative
effects can be addressed by partially containing the policy’s effects to intermediate
goods sectors, such as electricity or transportation services. We use a three-sector
model to study a policy that taxes emissions caused by intermediate goods pro-
duction while subsidizing the intermediate good. We show that such containment
is second-best for combating carbon leakage, maintaining international market
positions, and can reduce climate-policy-induced unemployment.
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3.1 Introduction
Substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions seem to be necessary to
address the problem of climate change. The costs of these reductions can be mini-
mized by a globally coordinated policy. But, so far, only few countries have com-
mitted to notable emission reductions, and it seems unlikely that binding emission
constraints will be accepted by the majority of emitters within the next years.
Despite this lack of global action, some governments pursue an active climate
policy. For instance, the EU aims at reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by
about 20% till 2020 and reduction targets have recently also been announced in
the US. Such unilateral1 policies are important, because they induce research in
abatement technologies, which reduces abatement costs and thus helps to con-
vince more countries to instate emission reduction measures. But governments
that enact such unilateral policies are often subject to intense domestic pressure.
Three arguments are frequently used to question the value of a unilateral cli-
mate policy. First, such a policy is seen as ineffective, because costly emission
constraints will drive emission-intensive industries to less active countries, so that
national emission reductions will be partially compensated by emission increases
in other countries (carbon leakage). Second, in the presence of labor market
imperfections, national emission reductions can cause unemployment. Emission
constraints will reduce the marginal productivity of labor, if these constraints are
unilateral and thus not adequately reflected in international product prices. Under
wage rigidities, this productivity reduction can induce unemployment. Finally,
national industries can become less competitive, so that favorable trade positions
can be lost. If a country has a strategic advantage on an international market, uni-
lateral climate policy can reduce this advantage and thus be rather costly from a
national perspective.
1To avoid awkward terminology, we refer to a national climate policy that is enacted outside
the context of a global agreement including binding emission reductions for the major emitters as
a “unilateral” policy. Of course, this term is not fully adequate, as some countries coordinate their
policies, as in the EU.
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There is extensive literature that addresses these issues.2 But while the main
conclusion is that a global coordination of climate policy is important, only few
studies investigate what should be done if international climate negotiations fail
or become stalled for some time. Is it possible to reduce the negative side effects
of unilateral climate policy by using specifically designed policy measures?
In principle, combating these side effects is simple. Supplementing climate
policy with tariffs or export subsidies could mitigate the negative effects of unilat-
eral action. However, by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, export subsidies are generally outlawed, while import tariffs on many
goods categories are bound or even cut to zero by the agreements of the Uruguay
Round, and national leeway for tariffs might be further reduced once the Doha
Round is concluded. The legality of alternative trade measures such as border
tax adjustments for energy inputs is disputed, and thus their applicability remains
controversial and uncertain.
Therefore, the literature focuses on less direct measures. The most frequently
discussed option is to differentiate climate policy between sectors that are open
to international trade and those that are not. Such policy differentiation is reason-
able from a national perspective, although it induces inefficiencies, (Hoel, 1996;
Withagen et al., 2007).
However, policy differentiation is not a universally applicable solution. A
substantial part of emissions is not directly caused by final goods sectors. Rather,
it results from the production of intermediate goods, and many export industries
are affected more by climate policy via increasing prices of these goods than via
direct compliance costs. An important example is energy. In 2006 around 30% of
the CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of the EU-27 were caused by the
energy industries (UNFCCC, 2006), and almost 40% of US CO2-emissions were
generated by electricity production (EIA, 2008a). A large fraction of this energy is
used as an input in export industries. Policy differentiation is not feasible if sectors
that differ with regard to their exposure to international competition do not directly
2We briefly review this literature in the following section.
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cause emissions but rather contribute to a country’s emissions by using emissions-
intensive intermediate goods. It is not possible to differentiate an emission tax
levied in an intermediate goods sector according to where the intermediate good
is used in final goods production. Thus, the benefits of adjusting emission taxes
to the exposure to international competition cannot be reaped.
But, as markets for important emission-intensive intermediate goods, such as
electricity or transportation services, are often national, it is possible to intervene
in these markets. For example, climate policy might lead to an increase in the
price of electricity and thus to higher costs in final goods production, which can
induce carbon leakage and unemployment as well as a loss of market power on
international markets. To reduce these side effects, it could be reasonable from a
national perspective to tax the emissions caused by electricity generation (thereby
inducing abatement, such as the use of more efficient power plants, wind or so-
lar energy) and to subsidize electricity to shield final goods production from in-
creasing electricity prices (thereby reducing the negative side effects of unilateral
climate policy).
Such a policy induces inefficiencies and alters the dynamic incentives of cli-
mate policy. But it could be a reasonable tool for a transitory climate policy until
broad international agreements are reached.
The idea of this containment approach is similar to the policy differentiation of
Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) in that this approach also aims at reducing
the burden of those sectors that are open to international trade. The concepts differ
in that they apply to different industries. Policy differentiation is possible, if the
sectors that are open to international trade directly cause substantial emissions, as
is the case in the cement industry or the iron and steel industry. Our approach ap-
plies to settings, where the sectors that are open to trade cause emissions mostly
by using energy-intensive inputs, as in manufacturing, parts of the chemical in-
dustry, or the service sector. Thus our containment approach is complementary
to the policy differentiation concept. Furthermore, both approaches have differ-
ent economic implications. Policy differentiation is costly, because it allocates
51
Chapter 3 Optimal containment
abatement inefficiently among sectors. Containment does not alter the allocation
of abatement but leads to an inefficient use of energy-intensive inputs. Thus the
consequences for factor allocation in the general equilibrium differ substantially.
In this paper, we use a simple model of unilateral climate policy in a small
open economy to investigate whether interventions in an intermediate goods mar-
ket are a reasonable way to alleviate the side effects of unilateral climate policy.
Our setup consists of a general equilibrium model of a three-sector economy. One
sector produces an intermediate good and is environmentally regulated, and the
two other sectors produce final goods with one sector being open to international
trade and one sector producing solely for the home country’s internal market. To
separate the strategic decision of whether a country will commit to a unilateral
policy from the question of how such a commitment should be implemented, we
assume that the policy target is already fixed.
In this setup, we consider the above three arguments against unilateral climate
policy and show that each of the negative side effects can be reduced by an in-
tervention in the intermediate goods market. For each of these cases, we derive
the optimal policy mix. Typically, it consists of an emission tax and a subsidy
on the intermediate good.3 Except for the case of maintaining market power, the
optimality of intervening in the intermediate goods market is not due to strategic
behavior.
In the following section, we briefly review the related literature. Then we set
up our model. In Section 3.4, we derive the optimal policy and analyze how our
approach relates to the concept of policy differentiation. Section 3.5 concludes
the paper.
3.2 Review of the Literature
Our study relates to three distinct strands of literature. The first of these is the liter-
ature on optimal policies in the presence of distortions such as factor immobility,
3In the case of maintaining market power, it can be optimal to tax the intermediate good.
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wage rigidity, or non-economic targets.
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) have shown that if the distortion is domes-
tic, that is, if, under laissez-faire, the domestic rates of substitution and trans-
formation are not equal, the best policy is domestic intervention. However, if
the domestic and the foreign rates of transformation differ, for example, due to
monopoly power, the optimal intervention is a trade tariff or subsidy. Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (1969) investigate the question of how to implement a given non-
economic goal, such as a certain employment level or a minimum output of a
given good, at the least possible social cost. The results of Bhagwati and Srini-
vasan (1969) relate intuitively to those of Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and
boil down to the principle that the optimal intervention takes place directly where
the non-economic objective lies and does not include trade intervention. For ex-
ample, to reach a given minimum domestic output level, the optimal policy is
an output subsidy (and not an import tariff). A collection and unification of re-
sults on distortions, policy interventions and welfare can be found in Bhagwati
(1971). Krishna and Panagariya (2000) add to the literature by clarifying some
important issues of the theory of second-best interventions. In particular, they
demonstrate that second-best policies crucially depend on whether the distortion
takes the form of a restriction of choice variables or is a restriction on a first-order
condition. In the former case, the first-order conditions of the first-best solution
continue to characterize the optimum, and there is no justification for intervention
in undistorted sectors.
The second line of research, which our paper relates to, is the climate pol-
icy literature. While game theoretic methods, in particular coalition theory, have
been widely applied to study the formation and stability of international climate
agreements,4 some research has also been done on unilateral climate policy in the
absence of a global framework.
Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) examine the question as to whether
emission regulation should be differentiated across sectors if a country pursues
4See Finus (2008) for a recent survey.
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climate policy unilaterally. Both Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) find
that there is no reason for a differentiated emission policy as long as trade policy
instruments such as tariffs are available. But in case trade policy is ruled out,
a differentiated regulation is second-best. This result is due to carbon leakage
in Hoel (1996) and due to terms-of-trade effects in Withagen et al. (2007). In
the absence of both carbon leakage and terms-of-trade effects, a uniform climate
policy is always optimal. Rauscher (1994) takes a positive rather than a normative
approach and finds that strategic trade incentives, terms-of-trade arguments or
political economy reasons might lead to sectoral differences in the stringency of
emission policy.
Also, CGE modeling has been applied to analyze the effects of unilateral cli-
mate policies. Böhringer and Rutherford (2002) study sectorally differentiated
tax regimes, and Dessus and O’Connor (2003) estimate ancillary benefits from
unilateral climate policy in Chile. Carbone et al. (forthcoming) study a setting
where countries set nationally optimal emission targets and can afterwards trade
emission rights internationally. Surprisingly, substantial emissions reductions can
be achieved in this way.
Finally, Copeland and Taylor (2005) explore a general equilibrium model with
many countries and demonstrate that there might be negative carbon leakage; that
is, unilateral emission cuts by some countries can lead to emission reductions by
other countries. This somewhat surprising result is due to an income effect that
counters the usual drivers of carbon leakage. Hence, the sign and magnitude of
emission change in the rest of the world after a unilateral emission reduction by
some countries is determined by a trade-off between free riding, substitution and
income effects.
The third set of studies that our analysis is related to is the double dividend lit-
erature. A double dividend from environmental regulation arises if, independent
of the reduction of environmental damage, a gain or a smaller loss in welfare is
achieved by using the proceeds from environmental taxation to replace or reduce
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pre-existent distortionary taxes.5 The weak double dividend hypothesis states that
the welfare costs of environmental taxation is lower if such a "green tax reform"
is carried out instead of returning tax revenue in a lump-sum fashion. If the
green tax reform as a whole comes at zero or negative costs, a strong double div-
idend is reaped (Goulder, 1995). The theoretical soundness of the strong double
dividend hypothesis has been widely criticized due to the tax-interaction effect,
which works against the welfare-increasing revenue-recycling effect (Bovenberg
and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). Through the
tax-interaction effect, environmental taxes raise the welfare costs of distortionary
income taxation by increasing prices and thus further lowering the already sub-
optimal labor supply. However, Schwartz and Repetto (2000) show that if the
assumption of separable utility functions is dropped, improvement of environ-
mental quality can increase labor supply partially or even entirely offsetting the
tax-interaction effect. Various other aspects of environmental revenue recycling,
such as distributional concerns (Mayeres and Proost, 2001) or the interplay of en-
vironmental taxes with trade taxes (Smulders, 2001) have been studied. However,
all of these concepts of additional dividends rely on the assumption of pre-existing
distortions. Hence, in the absence of distortions, no second dividend exists, and
optimal revenue recycling consists of lump-sum transfers.
3.3 The Model
We consider a small open economy that consists of three sectors. One sector pro-
vides an intermediate good, like electricity or transportation services, that is used
for production in two final goods sectors. One of the final goods is traded inter-
nationally, whereas the other is a domestic good. This vertical model structure
where the product of the upstream industry is not traded internationally resembles
the setup of Hamilton and Requate (2004), who study strategic environmental
5This argument was developed as early as in the 1980s, see, e.g., Terkla (1984), and Lee and
Misiolek (1986). For a survey see Schoeb (2003).
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Figure 3.1: The Model structure
policy.
Figure 3.1 shows a graphic representation of the model structure.
In our basic setup, all factors can move freely between sectors and all markets
are perfectly competitive. There is international trade for the above mentioned
final good with national and foreign products being perfect substitutes. Further-
more, the resources needed to produce the intermediate good (such as fossil fuels)
are imported. All other markets are national.
Greenhouse gas emissions arise only in the intermediate goods sector, which
is consequently the subject of environmental regulation. In industrialized coun-
tries, a large fraction of greenhouse gas emissions results from the production of
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intermediate goods like electricity generation and transportation services.6 For
instance, trucks, that are mainly used for commercial purposes, accounted for
more than 40% of gasoline and more than 80% of diesel consumption in the USA
in 2006 (EPA, 2008). The energy industries caused more than 25% of CO2-
equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of Annex I countries in 2006 (UNFCCC,
2006).7 Thus emissions from intermediate goods production are indeed quantita-
tively important. Furthermore, as we show in Section 3.4.4, our main conclusions
remain valid in more general settings.
We consider a unilateral climate policy where only the country under consid-
eration implements a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For simplicity,
we constrain our investigation to a regulation based on an emission tax. But our
results can be easily transferred to tradable permit schemes or to standards. As al-
ready mentioned, the policy aims at implementing a fixed national emission target,
such as the 20% target of the EU.
The emission tax leads to a higher price of the intermediate good (e.g., elec-
tricity) and thus to higher factor costs in final goods production. As the policy
is unilaterally enacted, the prices on international markets do not increase like-
wise, implying that production is shifted to countries without climate policy. The
purpose of our study is to investigate whether it is reasonable from a national
perspective to counter this effect by accompanying measures. As WTO rules pre-
clude tariffs or export subsidies, and the feasibility of border tax adjustments is
uncertain, we consider an accompanying intervention in the intermediate goods
6Often, these “intermediate” goods are also used as final goods in consumption. For simplicity,
we neglect this point. But it can be introduced into our model without substantial changes to our
results.
7These intermediate goods are usually traded mostly on internal markets. For example, both
the UK and the USA imported less than 1% of their total electricity consumption in 2007 (EIA,
2008b; BERR, 2008).
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market.8
We assume that production possibilities in the intermediate goods sector are
represented by the following cost function.
cI(qI , aI) = cP (qI) + qIcA(aI), (3.1)
where qI denotes output, aI is abatement, and cP , cA : R+ → R+ are twice differ-
entiable, strictly increasing cost functions with cP (0) = cA(0) = 0. Emissions are
given by e = qI(¯− aI). Thus cA(aI) are the costs of reducing emissions per unit
of production from their baseline level ¯, whereas cP (qI) are the production costs
in the absence of abatement. We assume that cA is a strictly convex function,
whereas cP might be linear (which implies constant returns to scale) or strictly
convex (implying decreasing returns to scale).9
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that these costs arise solely due to
the use of imported factors, such as fossil fuels or machinery, and that the amount
of labor employed in the production of the intermediate good is negligible on
a national scale. In the examples given above, this is a reasonable assumption.
Although electricity generation and transportation services account for a large
part of the emissions of industrialized countries, the fraction of labor employed in
these sectors is rather small.
We depict the production possibilities in the final goods sectors by production
functions that depend on the quantity of the intermediate good and labor. The pro-
duction functions are given by fNT (lNT , qI,NT ) : R2+ → R+, for the non-trading
sector, and by fT (lT , qI,T ) : R2+ → R+, for the trading sector. The variables
8Such an intervention conforms to WTO rules, as the policy subsidizes the domestic use of
the intermediate good. Even if a fraction of the intermediate good is imported or exported, the
intervention causes no distortion of international trade in the intermediate good, because the sub-
sidy would not differentiate between imports and domestic production and would not be paid for
exports.
9cP could also be a strictly concave function, corresponding to increasing returns to scale. In
this case, the second-order conditions need to be analyzed to assure that the optimal policy does
indeed correspond to a welfare maximum. This will hold, as long as the curvature of cP is not too
large, that is, as long as the scale effect is not too strong.
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lT , lNT denote the labor inputs of the final goods sectors and qI,T , qI,NT are the
quantities of the intermediate good used there. We assume that the production
functions exhibit constant returns to scale and are twice differentiable, strictly in-
creasing in their arguments, and strictly concave. There is a fixed supply of labor
L¯, so that full employment implies
lNT + lT = L¯. (3.2)
The climate policy consists of an emission tax τ and a subsidy σ. The former is
levied on the emissions of the intermediate goods sector, the latter is paid for the
output of this sector. The aim of the policy is to reduce emissions to an exoge-
nously given level e˜. We assume that the subsidy is not differentiated, that is, both
final goods sectors benefit from it. This is likely to be suboptimal. But a differen-
tiated subsidy would cause substantial problems in implementation and might be
seen as a trade-distorting measure. Furthermore, if an undifferentiated subsidy is
welfare increasing, the same also holds for an optimally differentiated subsidy.
We do not impose a budget constraint on the policy and do not account for
inefficiencies caused by raising the necessary revenue to cover a potential gap
between the expenditures for the subsidy and the revenue of the emission tax. In
effect, this amounts to assuming that profits gained by the policy are spent for a
lump-sum transfer to the households, whereas incurred losses are covered by a
lump-sum tax. This assumption is for presentational simplicity only; it does not
affect our main conclusions. As the policy induces a tax revenue, it is always
possible to have a strictly positive subsidy. Thus in a budget-neutral policy, the
optimal subsidy is either the subsidy that we derive in the following sections (if it
can be financed) or the maximum subsidy that can be financed by the tax revenue.
The firms in the intermediate goods sector maximize their profit
piI =(pI + σ)qI − cP (qI)− qIcA(aI)− τqI(¯− aI), (3.3)
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as the necessary tax τ to reduce emissions to e˜. Market clearing for the interme-






where q∗I,T and q
∗
I,NT denote the profit-maximizing intermediate good demand of
the final goods sectors.
The demand for the intermediate goods results from production in the final
goods sectors. In the non-trading sector, profit maximization implies
pI = pNT




∂fNT (lNT , qI,NT )
∂lNT
, (3.9)
where w denotes the wage and where pNT is the price of the non-traded good. In
the trading sector, we get
pI = pT




∂fT (lT , qI,T )
∂lT
, (3.11)
where pT is the international price of the traded good. Instead of using a nu-
meraire, we normalize prices so that pI + pT + pNT + w = 1.
To measure the national welfare effects of the policy, we use the welfare of
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a representative consumer with a utility function U(yT , yNT ) that depends on the
consumption of the final goods. Consumption expenditures are restricted by na-
tional income
pTyT + pNTyNT ≤ pTfT (lT , qI,T ) + pNTfNT (lNT , qI,NT )− cP (qI)− qIcA(aI).
(3.12)
To gain a reference point, we first consider a case in which there are no market
imperfections, no strategic behavior, and in which carbon leakage effects are not
taken into account. In this case, the optimal policy consists of an emission tax
without a subsidy, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 1. In the case of a small open economy without market imperfections and
without carbon leakage, the optimal policy to implement the emission target e˜ is
the emission tax (3.6) without an accompanying measure (i.e., σ∗ = 0).
Proof. Maximizing U(yT , yNT ) under the budget constraint (3.12), the market
clearing constraints (3.2), (3.7), and yNT = fNT (lNT , qNT ) with regard to yT ,
yNT , lT , qI,T , lNT , qI,NT , qI and aI yields first-order conditions that equal Eqs.
(3.4)–(3.5), (3.8)–(3.11) for σ = 0. The necessary tax to meet the target e˜ follows
from (3.6).
3.4 Designing a Unilateral Climate Policy
As shown above, an optimal climate policy in an ideal world would consist only of
a uniform emission tax or an emission trading scheme encompassing all emitting
sectors; additional measures, such as subsidies, or a policy differentiation would
only lead to distortions and reduce social welfare.
However, climate policy often has to be designed under less benign conditions.
In the following sections, we inquire whether the problems of carbon leakage,
induced unemployment, and loss of a favorable trade position can be reduced by
a (partial) containment of the effects of climate policy to the intermediate goods
sector.
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3.4.1 Reducing Carbon Leakage
The causes and the magnitude of carbon leakage have been extensively discussed
in the literature (e.g. Hoel (1991); Golombek et al. (1995); or Copeland and Taylor
(2005)). We investigate whether carbon leakage can be reduced by supplement-
ing climate policy with additional policy measures and to what extent it is in the
interest of a country to do so.
We assume that the home country is a small open economy in the sense that
the country’s exports or imports of the traded goods do not alter the prices on
the international markets and do not change foreign demand. This is the case, if
changes in domestic imports or exports are so small compared to the total trade
volume that foreign production adjusts at constant marginal costs to the amount
necessary for market clearing. Decreasing exports or increasing imports of the
home country are thus fully compensated by an increase in foreign production.
Of course, these assumptions are highly stylized and exclude several effects, espe-
cially income effects in the foreign countries. But they facilitate a clear separation
of the intervention incentives attributable to carbon leakage from those related to
terms-of-trade effects.
To depict carbon leakage, we assume that foreign firms use q¯T units of the
intermediate good to produce one unit of output of the traded good and that the
intermediate good in these countries is produced without abatement; that is, the
production of one unit of the intermediate good causes ¯ units of emissions. With
our above assumptions, global emissions E can thus be written as
E = (YT + yT − fT (lT , qI,T )) q¯T ¯+ e˜+ ENT,F . (3.13)
Here, YT denotes global demand for the traded goods and ENT,F are the foreign
emissions due to production of the non-traded good.
To assess the costs caused by carbon leakage, we assume that the home coun-
try benefits from the decreasing global emissions via a reduction of national envi-
ronmental damage, which we depict by a damage function d(E). We assume that
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d(E) is strictly increasing and convex in E for all E ≥ 0 and that it is a differ-
entiable function of E ∈ R+. As is standard, we subtract this damage from our
measure of national welfare and assume that there are so many consumers that in-
dividual incentives to reduce the environmental damage by adjusting consumption
are negligible.
With these settings, we get the following result.






> d′(E∗)q¯T ¯. Then, from a na-
tional perspective, it is optimal to subsidize the intermediate good. The optimal
subsidy is
σ∗ =







− d′(E∗) q¯T ¯







The necessary tax τ to constrain total national emissions to e˜ is given by Eq. (3.6).
Proof. See Appendix.
So, in the case of unilateral climate policy, it is optimal to subsidize the inter-
mediate good. This is intuitive, because there are two market failures. First, the
producers do not account for the costs of climate change, resulting in overproduc-
tion and a lack of abatement efforts. Second, the consumers do not consider these
costs in their consumption decisions, so that an increase in domestic production
costs due to policy-induced abatement efforts leads to a higher share of unregu-
lated foreign producers in total production. An emission tax (or permit trading)
can correct the first market failure. But if a unilateral climate policy is pursued
in an open economy, the tax cannot correct the second market failure as well;
consumers can avoid the increased costs of cleaner products by choosing goods
produced in an unregulated country, resulting in carbon leakage. Thus a second
intervention is necessary.
10This condition assures that it is socially optimal to consume the traded good.
63
Chapter 3 Optimal containment
The optimal subsidy is easily interpretable. The numerator depicts the reduc-
tion in damage, if an additional unit of the traded good is exported, times the
marginal productivity of the intermediate good in this sector. Thus it describes the
benefit, in terms of reduced damage, of supplying an additional unit of the inter-
mediate good to the traded-goods sector. The denominator equals the marginal so-
cial value of increased consumption normalized by the price of the traded good.11
Calculating the marginal reduction of the domestic excess supply (i.e., do-
mestic production minus consumption) due to subsidizing the intermediate good
shows that it is given by





P (qI,T + qI,NT )
pIc′′P (qI,T + qI,NT )
. (3.15)
The marginal reduction in national income B due to the subsidy is
∂B
∂σ
= − σ − τ(¯− aI)
c′′P (qI,T + qI,NT )
. (3.16)
With the optimal tax and subsidy, we get
d′(E∗) ¯ q¯T
∂(xT − yT )
∂σ
+





So the optimal subsidy balances its positive effects on the damage through less
carbon leakage with its negative effect on utility via reduced national income. The
reduction in national income stems from the inefficient factor allocation induced
by the subsidy. Due to the subsidy, the final goods sectors calculate with a price
of the intermediate good that does not reflect the marginal costs of supplying this
good. Consequently, they use a socially suboptimal factor combination, which
reduces national income.
The optimal subsidy does not directly depend on the production or the price
11The marginal damage is subtracted, because the policy results only in a second-best allocation.
The price of the traded good is not influenced, so that consumers do not take the damage caused
by increased consumption into account.
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of the non-traded good, because there are no distortions in this sector and, due
to its seclusion from international trade, it is not an apt vehicle for reducing car-
bon leakage. However, the non-traded goods sector indirectly affects the optimal
subsidy via the sectoral factor allocation.
Note that the optimality of intervening in the intermediate goods market is not
attributable to strategic behavior of the home country, because strategic incentives
cannot exist in the small open economy case considered here. Indeed, as Eq.
(3.14) shows, the optimality of subsidizing the intermediate good is solely due to
the damage caused by carbon leakage; for d′(E) = 0, that is, whenever carbon
leakage does not result in higher damage, it is optimal not to intervene in the
intermediate goods market.
The optimality of subsidizing the intermediate good is also not due to the
national emission target being exogenous. Optimizing national welfare (including
the national damage caused by national emissions and carbon leakage) with regard
to (t, σ) without a fixed emission target leads to an optimal subsidy again given
by Eq. (3.14) and τ = d′(E∗)pT/((∂U(yT , yNT )/∂yT )−d′(E∗)q¯T ¯). In this case,
the emission tax induces the intermediate goods sector to take the social damage
caused by emissions into account and the market intervention is used to reduce
the negative effect of carbon leakage.
The type of intervention studied here results in only a second-best outcome. A
first-best result would be achievable by a tariff/export subsidy on the traded final
good.12 Such an intervention would increase domestic production of the traded
good and decrease its domestic consumption without interfering with the optimal
factor combination. However, such a policy is infeasible under WTO rules.
Finally, carbon leakage can also be caused by declining prices for fossil fuels
induced by emission limits in the home country. As we consider a small open
economy, this type of carbon leakage is not covered by our analysis. However, the
containment strategy would also be helpful in this case, as it increases production
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of the intermediate good (and thus domestic fossil fuel consumption) compared to
a single-instrument policy.
3.4.2 Market Distortions and Policy-Induced Unemployment
Another reason for using a policy mix are national market imperfections, such as
price rigidities, factor immobility, or pre-existing market interventions. As unilat-
eral climate policy is often criticized for being likely to lead to unemployment, we
shall discuss a simple case of wage rigidities. The wage cannot adjust downward,
so that a climate policy that reduces the marginal productivity of labor causes
unemployment.
Initiated by Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), there is substantial literature
that analyzes market interventions in an open economy with distortions, that is,
with factor price rigidities and factor immobility. As discussed in Section 3.2,
the optimal policy consists of an intervention (usually a subsidy) in the distorted
market. In addition, there is extensive literature on designing environmental pol-
icy under pre-existing market interventions (see, for example, Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994) or Bovenberg and Goulder (1996)). Our setup deviates from the lat-
ter literature in that there are no pre-existing interventions; the economy is in an
efficient equilibrium before the introduction of the climate policy. Our approach
differs from the former literature in that we do not consider a change in the terms
of trade that renders the distortions relevant but rather a change in national policy
that reduces the supply of a factor (allowable emissions). Also, we do not assume
factor immobility and use a model that differentiates between intermediate and
final goods production.
In our case, an emission tax increases the price of the intermediate good, which
in turn induces a decline in the marginal productivity of labor, resulting in unem-
ployment. A subsidy on the intermediate good could be used to partially reverse
this effect and thereby reduce the unemployment attributable to climate policy.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of (τ, σ).
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Proposition 2. Assume that there is a lower boundary w¯ of the wage that equals
the wage before the introduction of climate policy. Then the optimal policy (τ ∗, σ∗)
consists of the tax (3.6) and the following subsidy









So, if climate policy induces unemployment due to wage rigidities, subsidiz-
ing the intermediate good is a feasible strategy to reduce unemployment. Two
cases can emerge. First, it can be optimal to subsidize the intermediate good so
that the price of this good is not affected by climate policy. This assures that
climate policy induces no unemployment. This is optimal, if the traded good is
labor intensive, that is, if l∗T/q
∗
T is large. Second, it can be optimal to reduce the
effect of the emission tax on the price of the intermediate good somewhat but
to keep this price higher than in the case without climate policy, which implies
some unemployment. This is the case, if the traded-goods sector is not too labor
intensive.
The optimal subsidy balances the gain of higher labor productivity, and thus
less unemployment, with the costs of an inefficient combination of abatement and
output reduction in the intermediate goods sector.
However, in contrast to the preceding and the following section, there is a
better and feasible way to reduce the costs of unemployment induced by climate
policy. This approach uses a subsidy on labor to bridge the gap between the wage
and labor productivity at full employment. It is easily shown (see, e.g., Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (1969)) that this is the best possible solution. Thus our argument is
not that a subsidy on the intermediate good should be used to overcome climate-
policy-induced unemployment.13 Rather, our analysis suggests that if such a sub-
13There can be situations, where a subsidy on labor is not politically feasible. For instance, sub-
sidizing labor can be costly, because the total labor force has to be subsidized. If the expenditures
for the subsidy have to be covered by taxes that cause distortions, it can be better to use a subsidy
on the intermediate good, which will often require much smaller expenditures.
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sidy is used for other reasons, for example to reduce carbon leakage, there is the
additional benefit that it reduces unemployment.
3.4.3 Maintaining Market Power
If the country committed to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is a large
supplier or demander of the traded good, then changes of the net excess demand
for that good will influence world prices. In the context of our model, this means
that unilateral climate policy indirectly changes the terms of trade by causing a
reallocation of factors between the non-traded-goods and the traded-goods sector
and thereby leads to changes in production. In such a case, an additional interven-
tion exploiting the country’s monopoly (monopsony) power in trade can increase
national income and thus welfare. If an optimal intervention had already been in
place before the implementation of the emission target, this intervention would no
longer be optimal and would need to be updated.
For analyzing the large country case, we need to slightly modify the model
developed in Section 3.3 by altering the budget constraint (3.12) to
pT (mT )yT + pNTyNT ≤ pT (mT )fT (lT , qI,T ) + pNTfNT (lNT , qI,NT ) (3.19)
− cP (qI)− qIcA(aI).
where mT := xT − yT is the country’s net excess demand for the traded good and
where pT (mT ) is the international price in dependency on this excess demand.
We assume that although the country’s export industry is large in the aggre-
gate, each individual firm is small and thus acts under perfect competition. Hence,
the incentives for adjusting the terms of trade are located on the government level
not the firm level.
In principle, “optimization” of the terms of trade should take the form of direct
trade measures such as export or import tariffs. Thus, in the presence of an emis-
sion limit and market power, the first-best policy is a combination of the optimum
trade tariff and an emission tax. However, ruling out direct trade intervention,
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the government has an incentive to use an intervention in the intermediate goods
sector as a secondary trade policy instrument. This is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. In case of a large country that has market power in the trading
sector but cannot use direct trade intervention, it is optimal to intervene in the
intermediate goods sector. The optimal intervention is given by












The necessary tax to constrain total national emissions to e˜ is given by Eq. (3.6).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the sign of the optimal intervention in the interme-
diate goods sector depends on the sign of mT , that is, on whether the country is
a net importer or exporter of the final good. In our case, the budget constraint
(3.19) implies that the country exports the traded good, as the resources for the
production of the intermediate good are imported. Thus a tax on the intermediate
good is optimal.
These results are intuitive in the light of the first-best trade policies. A classic
result from trade theory says that the first-best policy for a country with monopoly
power in trade is an export tax.14 As the intervention on the intermediate goods
sector is used as a substitute for such a direct measure, the optimal intervention
analogously contracts supply.
Note that the optimal intervention does not directly depend on the emission
target e˜. This is because the main driving force behind the intervention is its effect
on the terms of trade. This effect is present in a large economy independent of
an emission target. However, as the implementation of the emission target leads
to a change in the price of the intermediate good and thus to factor reallocation,
the magnitude of the optimal intervention is indirectly dependent on the emission
14This argument originally goes back to Bickerdike (1906).
69
Chapter 3 Optimal containment
target. Hence, setting an emission ceiling on the intermediate goods sector ren-
ders a previously optimal intervention suboptimal. In fact, the introduction of an
emission tax will lead to a decrease in the size of the optimal intervention, as the
emission tax is a substitute for the tax on the intermediate good.
The optimal intervention is neither equal nor equivalent to the optimal trade
tariff, that is, to the inverse of the export demand supply elasticity,15 due to two
reasons. First, the output of the intermediate sector is an input in both final goods
sectors. Hence, the intervention affects not only the production of the traded good
as would be the case for a trade tax, but also changes output of the non-traded
good. The reallocation of factors that leads to this change in output is inefficient,
and thus comes at the cost of a decrease in national income. However, this loss is
outweighed by an increase in national income due to the favorable change of the
terms of trade. Second, a tax on a trading-sector input is an indirect measure as
understood in the policy-targeting literature (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Ramaswami
(1963), and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969)) and thus an inefficient instrument
for the exploitation of monopoly power. Therefore, the optimal intervention goes
beyond balancing the terms-of-trade effect with the quantity-of-trade effect; it also
accounts for the inefficiencies that it produces as an indirect instrument.
Finally, this section has shown that it can be optimal not only to subsidize
the intermediate good but also to tax it. Thus if carbon leakage, unemployment,
and market power are simultaneously important in devising a unilateral climate
policy, it is not obvious whether the intermediate good should be subsidized or
taxed. However, some intervention in the intermediate goods market is optimal in
most cases. Furthermore, we have only considered a simple case of a large open
economy, where the good in question is always an export good. In many cases,
large countries have monopsony power in important markets. In such cases, the
optimal intervention is a subsidy on the intermediate good (cf. Eq. (3.20)), so that
15Of course, the optimal intervention is not independent of the price elasticity of export de-










ρ where ρ corresponds to the elasticity. For ρ → −∞, the opti-
mal intervention becomes zero, as the terms-of-trade effect of the intervention vanishes.
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the direction of the intervention is clear, even if several intervention incentives
apply simultaneously.
3.4.4 Differentiation or Containment?
Our analysis has shown that (partially) containing the effects of climate policy to
the intermediate good sector is a reasonable strategy to combat negative side ef-
fects of a unilaterally enacted policy, such as carbon leakage or unemployment. A
different approach to counter these effects is the policy differentiation analyzed in
Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007). As we have argued in the introduction,
the concepts of policy differentiation and containment are applicable in different
settings; policy differentiation if trading and non-trading sectors cause emissions
directly, containment if trading sectors contribute to overall emissions mainly by
using emission-intensive intermediate goods as inputs in their production pro-
cesses.
In most applications, there is a mixture of these cases: A part of emissions
originates directly from final goods production and another part stems from the
production of intermediate goods. Thus an important question arises: Which of
these concepts should be used?
To analyze this question, we extend our model. We introduce a fourth sector
that produces a final good, that directly causes emissions, and that is open to inter-
national trade. For simplicity, we assume that this sector is an export-only sector;
that is, its product is not consumed within the country. Out of the three reasons for
containment investigated in the preceding sections, we consider the case of carbon
leakage, because carbon leakage is widely discussed in the literature and provides
an important reason for policy differentiation. Thus we compare our concept of
containment to a case of policy differentiation that is similar to the one discussed
in Hoel (1996).
We model production possibilities in the fourth sector with a production func-
tion fR(lR, eR) : R2+ → R+ that depends on the amount of labor lR allocated
to this sector and the emissions eR of this sector. We assume that this production
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function exhibits constant returns to scale, is twice differentiable, strictly concave,
and strictly increasing in both inputs. Again, we use the small-open-economy as-
sumption; that is, the price pR for the fourth sector’s output is given and fixed.
The constraint for labor supply becomes lNT + lT + lR = L¯, the budget constraint
is
pTyT + pNTyNT ≤ pTfT (lT , qI,T ) + pNTfNT (lNT , qI,NT ) + pRfR(lR, eR)
(3.21)
− cP (qI)− qIcA(aI),
and total emissions are given by
E = (YT + yT − fT (lT , qI,T )) q¯T ¯+ (YR − fR(lR, eR)) ¯R + e˜+ ENT,F . (3.22)
Here, YR denotes global demand for the fourth sector’s good, and foreign produc-
tion of this good causes ¯R units of emission per unit of output. Note that we now
have a double carbon leakage effect: In both the traded final goods sector and the
fourth sector, climate policy can induce a shift of production to foreign countries
and thus an increase in foreign emissions.
To investigate the relation between policy differentiation and containment, we
introduce an emission tax τR levied on emissions in the fourth sector that can differ
from the tax τ charged for emissions in the intermediate goods sector. Under these









The following proposition shows that, in this setup, it is optimal to use policy
differentiation and containment simultaneously.
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> d′(E∗)q¯T ¯. Then, from a na-
tional perspective, it is optimal to subsidize the intermediate good and to differ-
entiate the emission taxes.
The optimal subsidy is given by
σ∗ =







− d′(E∗) q¯T ¯







The optimal taxes to constrain total national emissions to e˜ are
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∗























So, it is optimal to combine containment and policy differentiation. Emissions
that are caused directly by an exporting sector should be taxed differently from
emissions that originate from intermediate goods production. In addition, the
intermediate good should be subsidized.
This is due to the double carbon leakage effect. If emissions were identically
taxed and if there was no subsidy, the emission constraint would shift produc-
tion to foreign countries and thereby increase foreign emissions. As discussed in
Section 3.4.1, the subsidy on the intermediate good helps to reduce this negative
effect. In addition, policy differentiation is useful for two reasons. First, emissions
in the fourth sector are directly linked to exports (thus causing carbon leakage),
whereas a part of the intermediate good is used in the production of the non-traded
16Again, this condition assures that it is optimal to consume the traded good.
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final good (where there is no carbon leakage). This provides an incentive to tax
these emissions differently.17 Second, the subsidy on the intermediate good redu
ces the impact of the emission tax in this sector on carbon leakage, whereas no
such attenuating measure exists in the fourth sector. Again, this renders policy
differentiation reasonable.
Whether the optimal tax τ ∗R on emissions in the fourth sector is smaller or
greater than that on emissions in the intermediate goods sector (τ ∗) depends on
the relative strength of the two carbon leakage effects (i.e., on ¯ q¯T and ¯R), on the
relative prices of the outputs, and on the emission intensity in the fourth sector.











. If the price of the fourth sector’s output is small compared to the price
of the traded final good, or if foreign production of the fourth sector’s product
causes much higher emissions per unit than foreign production of the traded final
good, then the emissions in the fourth sector should be taxed less strongly than
emissions in intermediate goods production.
Finally, it is instructive to compare this policy mix to the case where there is a
fourth sector but where policy differentiation is not used. As can be easily shown,
the optimal policy in the latter case consists of the tax (3.26) and the subsidy
(3.25). Thus we get the same characterization of the optimal subsidy and the
tax as in the case with policy differentiation,18 only the tax is now applied to all
emissions.
3.5 Conclusions
Theoretically, climate policy should be globally coordinated. But, in practice,
such coordination is still lacking. In this paper, we have analyzed a unilateral cli-
17This effect is comparable to differentiating an emission tax between sectors with differing ex-
posure to international competition and thus with differing shifts of production to foreign countries
in response to climate policy.
18Note that although the expressions are the same, the actual value of these policy instruments
will differ, because these equations are evaluated at different equilibrium values of the endogenous
variables.
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mate policy that reduces the national costs of the policy while being compatible
with international trade rules. This concept extends the main idea of policy differ-
entiation to sectors where such differentiation is infeasible, such as intermediate
goods production. It consists of (partially) containing the effects of climate policy
to the production of an intermediate good that is emission intensive but not traded
internationally. In practice, such a good could be electricity or transportation ser-
vices, both of which account for a substantial fraction of national greenhouse gas
emissions in most industrialized countries and serve mainly internal markets. The
optimal containment strategy uses an emission tax to induce abatement efforts and
a product subsidy (or tax) to control the effects on other sectors. We have shown
that such a policy might help to counter three important objections against uni-
lateral greenhouse gas reductions: by attenuating carbon leakage, allaying policy-
induced unemployment, and helping to maintain a country’s favorable position
on international markets. Furthermore, we have shown that, in a setup with sec-
tors that contribute directly and indirectly to aggregate emissions, it is optimal to
combine the approaches of policy differentiation and containment.
Our analysis complements the literature on policy differentiation by consider-
ing the case of industries that are only indirectly accountable for greenhouse gas
emissions due to using an emission-intensive intermediate good. In this quanti-
tatively relevant case, a policy differentiation is not easily possible but an inter-
vention in the intermediate goods market can help to constrain the effects of the
climate policy to the intermediate goods sector. As in Hoel (1996) and Withagen
et al. (2007), the costs of being a front runner in climate policy can be reduced by
using a policy mix. Such a policy mix induces inefficiencies, because the emission
reduction is not achieved by an optimal combination of abatement efforts and out-
put reduction. But as output reductions are costly in the case of unilateral climate
policy, due to carbon leakage or unemployment, this containment is reasonable
from a national perspective.
An important objection to intervening in the intermediate good market is that
this reduces the incentives for adjustments in final goods production. Subsidizing
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electricity reduces the incentives to use more energy-efficient production equip-
ment and hampers adjustments in labor allocation, that is, a reallocation of la-
bor from sectors that are more affected by climate policy to less affected sectors.
However, it seems likely that climate policy will be coordinated among the ma-
jor emitters at some time in the future.19 Therefore, unilateral climate policy can
be expected to be transitory. But once all major emitting countries commit to
substantial emission reductions, international prices change and new adjustment
processes are induced. As these later adjustments are likely to partially reverse
adjustments that would seem necessary in the case of unilateral climate policy,
it seems reasonable to defer substantial adjustments until a broad international
consensus is reached. Furthermore, as containment uses a policy mix, it is easily
possible to meet the same emission target while reducing the subsidy to the inter-
mediate good over time. In this way, moderate adjustment incentives in the final
goods sectors can be set.
A point that we have not considered in our analysis are the implications of con-
tainment on international negotiations. Our approach increases the effectiveness
and decreases the costs of a national climate policy in the absence of a broad inter-
national agreement. Thus it is likely to induce more countries to adopt unilateral
emission reductions and to lead to the setting of stricter targets. So in the short run,
an increased reduction in global emissions can be expected. However, whether
this will facilitate or complicate international negotiations is not clear. Trade
economists have extensively analyzed the question whether unilateral trade lib-
eralization and regional trade agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks
for global free trade.20 The issue is still being actively studied and both views
have numerous advocates. To our knowledge, the question whether unilateral or
sub-global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions constitute building blocks
or stumbling blocks on the road towards a viable global climate agreement has not
yet been investigated, and thus remains an open and interesting field for research.
19Otherwise, few countries would continue to pursue an active climate policy.
20For surveys, see Winters (1996) and Panagariya (1999).
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Finally, as noted in the preceding sections, there are better ways (at least, in
theory) to reduce the negative side effects of unilateral climate policy. We have
chosen the intervention in an intermediate goods market, because it conforms to
WTO rules, is easily implementable, and is able to address several side effects
simultaneously. Of course, a policy that differentiates the subsidy among sectors
according to their exposure to international competition would be better. But such
a differentiated policy would be hard to implement and would, most likely, be
challenged as being an inappropriate intervention in export and import markets.
Furthermore, from a theoretical point of view, it is more important to show that
the use of a simple instrument is welfare increasing. Naturally, this conclusion ex-
tends to more sophisticated instruments, as these grant more degrees of freedom.
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Proof of Proposition 1
As the policy is a second-best policy, we calculate the subsidy σ∗ by assuming that
all endogenous variables (i.e., qI,NT , qI,T , lNT , lT , aI , pI , pNT , w) as well as τ ∗ (as
implied by Eq. (3.6)) are functions of this policy measure. We maximize the util-
ity of the representative individual minus the damage caused by global emissions
with regard to σ under the constraints that (i) total consumption expenditures do
not exceed national income; that (ii) consumption of the non-traded good equals
production of this good; and that (iii) total labor supply matches total labor de-




, which characterizes the optimal relative
consumption levels of the representative individual, the first-order condition can
be written as
∂U(yT , yNT )
∂yT
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where ν is the Lagrange coefficient of condition (iii) above.
To simplify this expression, we differentiate the characterization of firm be-
havior (Eqs. (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.8),(3.10) and the zero-profit conditions for final
goods sectors), the labor market constraint and our price normalization with re-
spect to σ, taking the above mentioned endogenous variables as being functions of





































(lT qI,NT − lNT qI,T )γ , (3.31)
with γ := ((¯ − aI)e˜ c′′A + (qI,T + qI,NT )2c′′P )/(qI,T + qI,NT )2. Substituting Eqs.
(3.29)-(3.31) into Eq. (3.28) yields Eq. (3.14). By our convexity assumptions, a
solution of Eqs. (3.6) and (3.14) is necessarily a welfare maximum.
Proof of Proposition 2
We calculate the subsidy as above, but now the market clearing constraint for
the labor market is only an inequality. The first order condition equals (3.28)
with d′(E) ≡ 0 and w = w¯. The Lagrange coefficient ν is zero, whenever the
labor market constraint is not binding. Differentiating the characterization of firm











































with the same γ as above. To calculate ∂qI,NT/∂σ, we differentiate the characteri-
zation of the representative consumer’s consumption bundle used in the preceding
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proof with respect to σ, substitute Eqs. (3.32)-(3.36) as well as the solution of the
first order condition for σ with ν = 0. This yields ∂qI,NT/∂σ = 0. Substituting
all these conditions into the first order condition, shows that σ∗ = w¯ lT/qI,T , if
ν = 0.
Whenever ν 6= 0, the labor market constraint is binding. In this case, we get
Eqs. (3.29)-(3.31), as in the preceding proof. Substituting these into the first-order
condition (3.28) (with d′(E) ≡ 0), leads to σ∗ = 0.
By assumption, w¯ equals the marginal productivity of labor if there is no emis-
sion constraint. With any binding emission constraint and without the subsidy, the
marginal productivity of labor is smaller than in this base case, because less of
the intermediate good is used in final goods production and, by our assumptions
on the technology, the intermediate good raises the productivity of labor. Thus
we cannot have full employment without a subsidy. The largest subsidy that is
compatible with ν = 0, is σ = cA(aI) + τ ∗(¯ − aI), as this subsidy reduces the
price of the intermediate good to its level without climate policy. Consequently,
the subsidy is either given by σ∗ = w¯ lT/qI,T or by this upper bound.
Proof of Proposition 3
We calculate the second-best intervention σ as above; only the price of the traded
good is now a function of the exported amount of this good. The first-order con-
dition is



























(σ + pI − τ ∗(¯− aI)) + τ ∗∂aI
∂σ























where λ and µ are the Lagrange coefficients of the representative consumer’s bud-
get constraint and of the labor market constraint. From analyzing the consumer’s
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optimization problem, we get λ = −(∂U(yT , yNT/∂yT )/(pT + p′TmT ).
Again, we differentiate the characterization of firm behavior, the labor market
constraint, Eq. (3.6), and the price normalization with respect to σ and get, with
exploiting the constant returns to scale assumptions, Eqs. (3.29)-(3.31). Substi-
tuting these expressions and that for λ into Eq. (3.37) yields Eq. (3.20). .
Proof of Proposition 4
Condition (3.26) for τ ∗ is the direct analogue to Eq. (3.6). We calculate the tax
τR as well as the subsidy σ by assuming that all endogenous variables (i.e., qI,NT ,
qI,T , lNT , lT , lR, eR, aI , pI , pNT , w) as well as he tax needed to implement the
emission limit (τ ∗) are functions of these policy measures and by optimizing the
utility of the representative individual minus the damage caused by global emis-
sions with regard to (σ, τR) under the constraints that (i) total consumption ex-
penditures do not exceed national income; that (ii) consumption of the non-traded
good equals production of this good; and that (iii) total labor supply matches total
labor demand. The first-order conditions are
1
pT
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∂yT




















































where ν is the Lagrange coefficient of condition (iii) above.
To simplify these expressions, we use the same approach as above (with the
characterization of firm behavior in the fourth sector being used in addition) to get




and with γ now being defined as γ := ((eR− ¯)2 c′′A + (qI,T + qI,NT )3c′′P )/(qI,T +
qI,NT )
3. Furthermore, we get ∂lR/∂σ = ∂eR/∂σ = 0. For the derivatives with






























































Again, we have γ := ((eR − ¯)2 c′′A + (qI,T + qI,NT )3c′′P )/(qI,T + qI,NT )3 and
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we have defined γT := (lRqI,NT (qI,T + qI,NT )2γ − eR(e˜− eR)lNT c′′A)/(eR(qI,T +
qI,NT )) and γNT := (lRqI,T (qI,T +qI,NT )2γ−eR(e˜−eR)lT c′′A)/(eR(qI,T +qI,NT )).
Substituting these expressions into Eqs. (3.38)-(3.39) yields conditions (3.25)
and (3.27).
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Concluding remarks and outlook
The results of the three papers comprising this thesis and their interpretations are
presented in the Introduction and Summary sections. In my concluding remarks, I
would like to draw attention to what is not part of the thesis, and to questions that
were not addressed in the three papers and those that might arise from them. The
objective here is not to summarize the technical or theoretical limitations of the
various models and the implicit or explicit assumptions that they incorporate, but
rather a policy-focused overview of the research fields that could not be touched
upon in the papers themselves, since they were written under the constraints of
scope and space imposed on research papers in economics intended for publica-
tion. In addition, I would like to suggest some promising new avenues of research
for future investigations.
In the first chapter, it has been shown that international environmental agree-
ments between a subset of affected parties could lead to a global welfare loss,
although they (at least partially) internalize an externality. However, if all coun-
tries cooperate, an agreement would necessarily be globally efficient. This begs
the question of whether small agreements will expand and ultimately comprise all
countries, in which case potential initial welfare losses might be outweighed by
future gains from global cooperation, or continue to remain exclusive and lock-
in inefficient settings. If sub-global agreements harm outsiders to the benefit of
insiders, the countries concluding the agreements might not be interested in their
enlargement. Hence, the dynamic properties of partial agreements have to be
properly understood in order to be able to assess whether they constitute stum-
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bling blocks or building blocks on the road towards global cooperation. For this, a
dynamic model of international negotiations between a large number of countries
is needed. A dynamic extension of the coalition model that has found wide appli-
cation in the analysis of international climate negotiations might be an appropriate
tool for this task. Dynamic analysis of this kind would certainly be an interesting
and highly challenging project for future research.
A further step towards applied research in this field could consist in quantify-
ing the welfare effects accruing from existing IEAs. From a methodological point
of view, CGE-modeling could be an adequate tool for such empirically-driven
quantitative analyses.
In the second chapter, the effects of relaxing the assumption of purely welfare-
maximizing governments have been analyzed in a strategic environmental policy
setting. As an illustration, governments were assumed to behave as revenue max-
imizers. This, of course, is a highly stylized setting the aim being simplicity and
the clearest possible exposition of the results. In a more complex setting, possibly
consisting of a lobbying model or a principal-agent setup, it would be possible
to depict more realistic and nuanced political decision-making processes. This in
turn, would facilitate empirically-driven positive analysis of real-world issues.
Another extension of the second chapter could be the introduction of addi-
tional policy dimensions into the government’s decisions. One possibility is to
consider a general equilibrium model where governments set an array of taxes,
and interaction effects, for instance, between income and environmental taxes are
present. In such a context, the incorporation of more complex political decision-
making processes that diverge from the assumption of a good dictator that simply
maximizes welfare might lead to interesting results informing the double-dividend
discussion.
Optimal unilateral climate policy has been analyzed in the third chapter. Just
as an analysis of the dynamic properties of international agreements, the topic
of Chapter 1, would carry the discussion forward, an exploration of the dynamic
implications of unilateral action for international negotiations would represent a
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natural extension of the results presented in chapter 3. If more and more countries
implement emission reductions unilaterally, this will certainly have an impact on
the dynamic international incentive structure and on the likelihood of reaching
a broad international climate agreement. Again, coalition theory might be part
of a framework that allows to investigate how unilateral policy measures affect
international climate agreements over time.
The third chapter also highlights some legal uncertainties in the field of envi-
ronmental policy and international trade law. As numerous environmental policy
measures impact on international trade, the question arises which of these are
potentially actionable under the WTO agreements. Although recently some en-
vironmental economists have done research on these issues, more integrated and
interdisciplinary work is needed in this field to clarify the feasible legal framework
of unilateral climate policy.
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